Professor Walter KAUFMANN begins his outstanding book on Nietzsche by a Prologue entitled „The Nietzsche Legend“. Nietzsche had become a myth even before his death – shortly after his fatal illness struck him in 1889. It is generally known that few listened to him and even fewer read his works: he could not even find an editor for some of these and was obliged to publish them at his own charges. Less than a year before Nietzsche's mind became irretrievably dimmed, the well-known Danish literary critic and historian, Georg BRANDES had begun to lecture on Nietzsche's philosophy and his articles reintroduced him to Germany. Henceforth Nietzsche’s fame spread rapidly throughout the cultural world. In a relatively short time it reached also the Far East and, as might be expected, Japan in the first place. OKAZAKI Yoshie goes so far as to state that the translation of Nietzsche's Also sprach Zarathustra (Thus Spoke Zarathustra) „began to be published in Japan in 1882“ – hence, even before Nietzsche wrote the first words of his monumental work.

It is possible that the first outstanding Chinese to have at least mentioned Nietzsche was the well-known reformer and introductor of European philosophy and literature into China – LIANG Ch'i-ch'ao (1874–1929). According to him, MARX and Nietzsche represented the two principal currents in German philosophy of the last century.4

The first to have rendered Nietzsche's teaching accessible to Chinese intellectuals, however, was the eminent Chinese literary critic and historian WANG Kuo-wei1(1877–1927). He wrote, for example, the study Shu-pen hua yü Ni-ts'ai2 (Schopenhauer and Nietzsche), which appeared in book form in Ching-an wen-
chi³ (Ching-an’s Writings), in 1905.⁵ Brief references to Nietzsche were made by young Lu Hsün (1881–1936) in his articles from the year 1907.⁶ Both these authors had studied Nietzsche's writings or works about him in Japan. Wang Kuowei laid stress on his individualism, while Lu Hsün was impressed both by his individualism and his iconoclastic spirit.

But the first extensive scientific treatise devoted to Nietzsche's life and works came from the pen of the philosopher and literary historian Hsieh Wu-liang⁸, published under the title Tê-kuo ta che-hsüeh-cho Ni-ts’ai-chih lüeh-chuan chi hsüeh-shuo⁹ (A Short Biography of the Great German Philosopher Nietzsche and His Doctrine), which appeared in 1915.⁷

While interest in Nietzsche began to be manifest in Japan as early as the end of the last and the beginning of the present century, Nietzsche became one of the subjects of interest in China only at the end of the second and at the beginning of the third decade of this century – i.e. the last months of 1919 and the first months of 1920. And precisely these months will form the main topic of the present study.

In China, too, Nietzsche was a myth. He was received there with expectancy and with fear, with hopes and with execration. He loomed great, but was unknown to them. Not one of the other great philosophers was so little understood, and so misconceived by the Chinese as precisely Nietzsche. He was incomparably less satisfactory to China than Marx, with whom he had been associated by the first spiritual leader of China on the road to its philosophical modernization – Liang Ch’i-ch’ao.

2

The May 1918 issue of the magazine Hsin ch'ing-nien (La Jeunesse) published the first short story by Lu Hsün, entitled K’uang-jen jih-chi¹⁰ (The Diary of Madman). Young Chinese men of letters – for they alone read the new literary works written in the new literary language and the new literary forms – were taken by surprise. They detected in it a work of great power, or great literary and philosophico-historical importance. An unknown author, coming out for the first time under this pseudonym, endeavoured on a few pages of text to cut the ground from under the feet of the greatest idol of contemporary China, one of the great obstacles on the road to progress – Confucian morality – strove to reassess Chinese history, and in a few words to rate the entire social order and relations among men. He put the sign of equality between four words expressing the most im-


⁶ These are the following articles: „Wen-hua p’ien-chih lun“⁶ (The Onesidedness of Culture) and Mo-lo shih-li shuo⁷, (On the Power of the Mara Poetry), both in Lu Hsün ch’üan-chi (The Complete Works of Lu Hsün), vol. 1, Peking 1961, p. 179–234.

⁷ Ta Chung-hua (Great China), 1, 7–8 (July 1915), p. 1–8, 1–12.
important categories of the old ethics and philosophy of China, *jen* (human-heart-edness), *i* (righteousness), *tao* (Way), *te* (power), and the words „Eat people!“.

Of course, Lu Hsün was concerned with criticism of ethical practice, less so with that of Chinese ethical theory in so far as it did not obstruct the development of a morally healthy individual.

More will be said about this short story later. If we mention it here, it is because it was one of the factors creating an atmosphere in which interest in Nietzsche in Chinese reality was quite understandable. This reality itself was influenced by Nietzsche, it was itself a product of this atmosphere.

First, a few words on the pre-history of this atmosphere.

The first Chinese to devote himself in a larger measure to the study of European philosophy and to begin, likewise in a larger measure, to acquaint with it the Chinese public, was YEN Fu (1853–1921). Yen Fu translated and commented the works of Th. HUXLEY, A. SMITH, J. S. MILL, MONTESQUIEU and others. He achieved his greatest success by his commented translation of Huxley’s book *Evolution and Ethics*, published in Chinese under the title *T’ien-yen-lun*. This eminent popularizer of evolution became through Yen Fu’s very peculiar but brilliant translation, an introductor of evolutionary teaching in China. Yen Fu, in his comments to this book, wrote much also about DARWIN’s and SPENCER’s philosophies. No other book from the first two decades of this century had an impact in China comparable to this. The most outstanding representatives in China in the first half of this century, HU Shih (1891–1926). Lu Hsün, LIANG Ch’i-ch’ao, TS’AI Yüan-p’ei (1867 –1940), and MAO Tse-tung, were all influenced by Yen Fu’s translations, but particularly by that of Huxley’s book.

Another European philosophical book that made a relatively strong impression on the Chinese intellectuals was KROPOTKIN’s *Mutual Assistance*. This famous Russian anarchist expounded in his book entirely antithetical life and philosophical premises to those held by social Darwinists. Huxley, of course, was not a social Darwinist, but Yen Fu, through his rather freely paraphrased translation, made him into one. Instead of a „struggle for life“ as the most fundamental philosophical tenets of Darwinists, Kropotkin came up with the idea of „mutual assistance“. For examples of this diametrically opposite maxim, he had recourse to the world of nature and men.

It may be of interest to observe the process by which the history of European philosophy was rendered accessible to China. The motives for this were usually pragmatic ones. In propagating European philosophy, Yen Fu strove only to achieve *tu* (wealth) and *ch’iang* (power) for his poor and weak country. Kropotkin’s bible was intended to convince anarchists of the possibility, nay the inevitability of setting up a new society erected on the basis of their ideals. In 1919 John DEWEY came to lecture in China not only to win over the country to his philosophy, but also to influence its evolution both politically and economically. After
Dewey's instrumentalism, Marxism in LENIN's, and later in Mao Tse-tung's interpretation proved the most viable. Any philosophy that could not become an „instrument for action”, had no hope of succeeding. True, KANT, HEGEL, EUCKEN, DRIESCH and many others were studied in China. Some foreign philosophers lectured in person at Chinese universities; but their influence was very small in comparison with that exerted by social Darwinism, anarchism, pragmatism, and finally by Marxism.

How could Nietzsche's teaching help China in carrying out her political, economic and other reforms? Could it be of help in the ethical domain? Could the pragmatic result of its influence become manifest in any way? Answers to these questions permit to sense fairly clearly its further fate in this country.

We would, of course, wrong Chinese philosophers were we to accuse them of an utterly blind utilitarianism. A number of them were engaged in the propagation of European philosophy to enable Chinese readers to broaden the scope of their knowledge. Such were, for instance, writers centered around the magazine Tung-fang tsa-chih (The Eastern Miscellany). Others made no account – at least not in the early twenties – of economic and political aspects. In the philosophical giants with whom they acquainted the Chinese reading community, they chose to note first and foremost, their spiritual contribution to the history of world philosophy, their place and merits. The utilitarian aspect was secondary only. Such a course was followed, for example, in the journal Min-To[^1] (The People's Bell).

What was it precisely that stimulated interest in Nietzsche in China? It was in particular the goals Chinese revolutionaries wished to attain in the sphere of thought and ethics. Were we briefly to characterize the causes for which Chinese philosophers and men of letters became interested in Nietzsche, it would suffice for us to state here his famous postulate of „revaluation of all values“ (Umwertung aller Werte).

Revaluation of all values was on the programme of the well-known journal of young Chinese revolutionaries La Jeunesse. In 1916 when President Yüan Shih-k'ai[^1] could no longer exercise his absolute power, the first articles directed against Confucius and his teaching began to appear. Among the most outstanding personalities to attack. Confucianism were Professor CH'EN Tu-hsiu (1879–1942), later to become Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, and WU Yü[^1] (1872–1949), an expert in law and political sciences. Both had as their primary aim to destroy Confucianism, a product, according to them, of feudal society, unsuited to the needs of modern world. Values of Confucianism were something that had to be reappraised, revalued, and idols had to be removed. In one of his articles Ch'en Tu-hsiu wrote these fiery words:

*Destroy? Destroy idols. Our beliefs must be based on a reality and reason-ableness. All the phantasies handed down from ancient times, religious, po-itical and ethical, and other false and unreasonable beliefs are idols which should be destroyed! If these idols are not destroyed, universal truth cannot be restored to the profound beliefs in our minds.*
To these words Professor CHOW Tse-tsung, a prominent expert of this period in Chinese history, adds this brief commentary: „This was the call of the time.“

Individual philosophers, politicians, men of letters adopted various approaches or -isms: some turned also to Nietzsche.

3

The first to present Nietzsche's teaching to the young readers of the May Fourth Movement period, was SHEN Yen-ping[16] (born in 1896), later known under the pseudonym of MAO Tun[17]. Four numbers of the periodical Hsüeh-sheng tsa-chih (Students' Magazine), brought his article „Ni-ts'ai-ti hsüeh shuo“[18] (Nietzsche's Teaching). This is one of an extensive series of articles written around 1919, intended to make European cultural, philosophical and literary heritage accessible to China. At this time we find among the editors of Shanghai journals men whose critical or philosophical output astounds us by its volume. They wrote much, and often published their works under pseudonyms. These are works with which anyone could hardly come out in public here in Europe. However, they often contain much wisdom – due not so much to the merits of their Chinese „creators“ as to their European authors, whose names sometimes remained quite unknown. The reason was that their Chinese introducers at times failed to acknowledge their debts. Consequently, these original authors are sometimes difficult, if not impossible, to identify. Occasionally these articles are but abridged or adjusted translations of original works in philosophy or literary criticism. Frequently they are nothing more nor less than mere reviews with quotations. Their value from the aspect of philosophy or literary criticism waxes or wanes with the talent of the Chinese introductor, his erudition and skill. However, they always played an important role in that they rendered accessible to the Chinese the world's cultural riches, and thanks are due in the first place to them for introducing European and American culture into China.

Young Mao Tun, an admirer of Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Lu Hsün, reached out for Nietzsche in order to introduce him to young students, and simultaneously to other readers. He followed in this the same pattern as other introducers. First of all, he went over the relevant chapters about Nietzsche from H. HÖFFDING's book, Modern Philosophers, and F. THILLY's book, History of Philosophy. These works, however, provided him only with the most important data and concise characteristics. Mao Tun evidently wished to write a more extensive treatise. He probably presumed that Nietzsche's philosophy might be suitably utilized also to fill the needs of the New China. The principal source on which he drew for his article – otherwise the longest he ever wrote – was the book by the English Nietzschean, Anthony M. LUDOVICI, published in London in 1910, under the title Nietzsche: His Life and Works.

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It should be observed that A. M. Ludovici was an admirer of Nietzsche's work. The prologue to his book was written by Dr. Oscar Levy, editor and partly also translator of *The Complete Works of Friedrich Nietzsche* in 18 volumes. Mao Tun states that he made use of Levy's translations when translating into Chinese. Mao Tun is probably the first to have published a more consistent text from Nietzsche in Chinese. In the semi-monthly *Chieh-fang yu kai-tsao* ([19] *Emancipation and Reconstruction*) he published a translation of chapters 12 and 13 of the first part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. When writing about Nietzsche, Mao Tun made use of translations from Ludovici.

Ludovici's book consists of four chapters entitled: „Nietzsche the Amoralist“, „Nietzsche the Moralist“, „Nietzsche the Evolutionist“, and „Nietzsche the Sociologist“. Mao Tun's article has the same subdivisions except that chapters 2 and 3 are combined.

Another event that should be noted is that at the time when Mao Tun wrote this article (i.e. December of 1919), a very important and interesting document appeared in *La Jeunesse* entitled „Hsin ch'ing-nien ts'a-chih hsü-an-yen“ ([20] A Manifesto of La Jeunesse). It was prepared and elaborated by CH'EN Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao (1888–1927), founders of the Chinese Communist Party, but there are no ideas in it that could be qualified as Marxist-Leninist, all being explicitly pragmatic. At the time when China began to show interest in Nietzsche, John Dewey with his instrumentalism was the most influential philosopher in China.

In the manifesto it was stated:

We believe that politics, ethics, science, the arts, religion and education should all meet practical needs in the achievement of progress for present and future social life.

We have to give up the useless and irrelevant elements of the traditional literature and ethics because we want to create those needed for the progress of the new era and new society.

We believe that it is requisite for the progress to uphold natural science and pragmatic philosophy (*shih-yen che-hsüeh* ([21])) and to abolish superstition and phantasy.

And further:

We believe that, in the traditional ideas of politics, ethics and economics in all countries of the world, there are many illogical and inhuman elements which thwart the progress of society. In order to seek social progress, it is necessary to break up the prejudices that are upheld as „unalterable principles“ (*t'ien-ching ti-i* ([22]) or as „established from old“ (*tzu-ku ju-ssu* ([23])). Consequently, we are determined to get rid of these antiquated ideas, and, by synthesizing conclusions reached by ancient and modern thinkers and ourselves, to create new ideas in politics, ethics and economics, and to establish the spirit of the new era, in order to adapt ourselves to the special circumstances of the new society.12

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We have quoted from this document at length because it characterized and ultimately helped to create an extremely fertile atmosphere reacting to the Western impact that was never present in that measure in China either before, or after.

An enormous problem and a method of investigation was underlined here for philosophers and popularizers of philosophy. It was necessary to investigate and utilize the extensive field of European and Chinese philosophy and the method of investigation must have been the instrumental method of Dewey. Mao Tun as one of the younger people close to Ch'en Tu-hsiu, identified himself with the views expressed in the „Manifesto“. He reached out to Nietzsche as to a philosopher who, he thought, might be useful to China. He approached him armed at least with the basic principles of pragmatism and from the position of a man sympathizing with Kropotkin's anarchism, as will be shown later. Moreover, we are of the opinion that with the exception of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Mao Tun had not read any other of Nietzsche's works.

A. M. Ludovici on the other hand, had read a great deal of Nietzsche and translated him. Even before Mao Tun became acquainted with his work, this author had written two books on Nietzsche,\textsuperscript{13} and the American scholar C. Brinton speaks of Ludovici as a „tough“ Nietzschean.\textsuperscript{14} He always adhered to the letter rather than the true meaning and logic of Nietzsche's pronouncements. Therefore, he was against democracy, socialism, industrialism, pacifism, feminism and was for the government by true aristocrats. Later, in 1937, he sympathized with the Nazis, writing that „Hitler was working to restore the true, „biological values of mankind“ to bring back on earth that pre-Socratic lustiness and innocence that Master praised as Dionysian“.\textsuperscript{15}

Ludovici was one of the group of English Nietzscheans clustering around O. Levy. These were influenced by English philosophy, in particular by that of H. Spencer and hence they found „the conception of Nietzsche as at bottom a profound evolutionist“\textsuperscript{16} to be suitable.

Mao Tun in turn found Ludovici's book suitable for several reasons: relatively much space in it was devoted to ethical issues that were the focus of attention in China at that time. In addition, the question of evolution had absorbed Chinese intellectuals since Yen Fu's times and social questions in those days were among the most important in China.

Already in his „introduction“ in which Mao Tun initiates the reader into his subject, he states that the „greatest and the best“ concept which we may attain on the basis of Nietzsche's work is his postulate of revaluation of all values.\textsuperscript{17} On reading Thilly's historical treatise he says that Nietzsche was the precursor of pragmatism, and again in virtue of the pragmatic doctrine he infers that when

\textsuperscript{13} The second book by Ludovici appeared under the title Nietzsche and Art, 1918.

\textsuperscript{14} Crane Brinton, Nietzsche, Harvard University Press 1948, p.195.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid. p.195–196.

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid. p.191.

\textsuperscript{17} Yen-ping (Mao Tun's name), Nietzsche's Teaching, p.2.
studying Nietzsche's books we must discern „what is the most useful, what brings the greatest profit”.\(^{18}\) „The creation of new values, new principles, new standards“ (Ludovici's idea) should be the outcome of a revaluation of all values.\(^{19}\) Mao Tun considered the creation of new ethical teaching, anti-Christian in orientation, and the idea of a superman, as brilliant. Moreover, in agreement with the authors of the „Manifesto of La Jeunesse“, he thought that the words of the ancients need not be considered as „unalterable principles“, that everyone who read their works had the possibility of doubting and criticizing them.\(^{20}\) Hence, also, in contrast to Ludovici, Mao Tun appraised them critically.

The chapter dealing with Nietzsche's life and work does not contain anything noteworthy. It is a concise summary of a similar section in Ludovici's book.

The next chapter devoted to Nietzsche's ethics is of more interest. Mao Tun affirms Nietzsche's ethics to be „very revolutionary“.\(^{21}\)

In the opening pages of this chapter he expounds his own views on Nietzsche's ethics, thus unconsciously revealing how he understood and especially failed to understand Nietzsche. As this part constitute an exemplary illustration of his philosophical approach – which is subsequently repeated in various modifications in his article – we shall again quote from it rather extensively:

He (Nietzsche) considered life as a struggle for existence, asserting that it tends upwards. He was not satisfied with the contemporary social organization, morals, and not even with „man“. In his mind he carried the „superman“, and in his efforts at achieving this goal, he sacrificed all the weak and the stupid of today ... We must understand that humanity strives for progress, but it is not certain whether progress can be achieved on the basis of a competitive struggle, when the strong swallow the weak. The stupid and the weak are a blemish on the face of society, are a great obstacle to progress, destroy „beauty“ and „good“, but this does not mean that when the stupid and the weak are removed, a „good“ and „beautiful“ superman will be achieved.\(^{22}\)

This passage just quoted from Mao Tun is of great importance, as it gives a clue to his reasoning and his comprehension of Nietzsche. On reading it one realizes that in his view the fault is not with the ethical ideal that is precisely a revaluation of all values, only the method by which to achieve this ideal is wrong. One must further realize that Mao Tun failed to understand Nietzsche's superman. But then, hardly anybody understood him at the time. Nietzsche's idea of superman did not tally with that formerly conceived and represented in universal consciousness. Nietzsche's superman cannot be explained in terms of Darwinism. To translate the German word Übermensch into English, W. KAUFMANN coins the

\(^{18}\) Loc. cit.
\(^{19}\) Loc. cit. and LUDOVICI, op. cit. p.4.
\(^{20}\) Yen-ping, Nietzsche's Teaching, p.3.
\(^{21}\) Ibid. p.13.
\(^{22}\) Loc. cit.
The term superman used until now is misleading. Numerous investigators and popularizers of Nietzsche's works were surprised and led astray by Nietzsche's philosophical method and symbolism. This was so already during his lifetime and, therefore, in his work *Ecce Homo* he writes about „scholarly oxen“, who have twisted the meaning of his *Übermensch* in the sense of social Darwinism. And it was this explanation in particular that found a well-prepared philosophical soil in China: before the advent of American pragmatism and European Marxism, no other philosophy made such a powerful impression in China as social Darwinism. However, the problem of the superman will be dealt with later.

The passage from Mao Tun’s article quoted above, includes the word „progress“. This belongs to Mao Tun, not to Nietzsche. The whole passage is so worded that the reader may gather the impression that Nietzsche, too, believed in similar progress as Mao Tun did, or the proselytes of evolutionism had done before him. Nietzsche, however, did not believe in progress that could be defined Darwinistically, or in terms of social Darwinism. Mao Tun likewise doubted about social Darwinistic progress. At the beginning of his book *Antichrist*, Nietzsche wrote these words:

> Mankind does not represent a development toward something better or stronger in the sense accepted today. „Progress“ is merely a modern idea, that is, a false idea. The European today is vastly inferior in value to the European of the Renaissance: further development is altogether not according to any necessity in the direction of elevation.

In so far as Nietzsche's references to the stupid and the weak are concerned, and also his conviction that war is better than peace, it should be observed that Nietzsche always used these words in a moral sense in a wider sense of terms. They were always a symbolical expression of what he wished to convey differently from others. Take, for instance, the provocative chapter „Of War and Warriors“ in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*. R. J. Hollingdale rightly points out that a careful reading of this chapter „will dispel the idea that Zarathustra is here advocating war. It is a slash of opinions not a clash of arms that Nietzsche has in mind“.

In the exposition of Nietzsche's teaching, Mao Tun was much taken up with the idea of master morality and slave morality. As convinced democrat Mao Tun was inherently bound to fundamentally condemn this concept of which he learnt from Ludovici and partly also from Höfding. The first type of morality manifests itself in all that is creative, active, famous, great, while the second

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23 W. Kaufmann, op. cit. p.266.
type is all that is conservative, passive, dark, that which submits and accommodates itself to the milieu. Nietzsche's concept of a master morality and a slave morality, however, plays a comparatively small role in his writings.\(^31\) As ROYCE observes, Nietzsche's analysis of slave morality does not mean that he himself professed master morality.\(^32\) The latter, in fact, does not coincide with his own ethics. Ludovici succumbed to an illusion and from a minor, insignificant issue, he made the cornerstone of Nietzsche's philosophy. And Mao Tun followed suit.

Mao Tun rightly discerned the greatest values of Nietzsche's doctrine to hide in ethical endeavours, but he failed to comprehend the essential contents of his ethics and erroneously surmised it to be destined for the governed masses and the governing class. Nietzsche's ethics, similarly as his whole philosophy, however, was destined only for the narrow circle of those who succeeded in understanding him and could become supermen – of course, supermen in the sense in which he himself understood a superman.

According to Mao Tun, the basic significance of Nietzsche's ethics resided in the creation of the superman.\(^33\) This is evidently a correct percept. What was less correct, however, was that in his understanding of superman, Mao Tun was influenced by English Darwinists. Such an influence was present here, even though it appears paradoxical, for socially Mao Tun did not think in terms of social Darwinism.

When writing about the superman Ludovici takes note of premises in Darwinistically-oriented thought and Nietzscheanism, thereby wishing to underline the superiority of Nietzsche's ideas. Ludovici criticizes H. SPENCER'S fundamental view according to which „life is activity“, or „the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations“, and also the view according to which this „activity“ means „the struggle for existence“.\(^34\) Ludovici stands fully behind Nietzsche's concept when he states that „the general aspect of life is not a state of want or hunger: rather it is a state of opulence, luxuriance and even absurd prodigality – where there is a struggle, it is a struggle for power“.\(^35\) This is of course the opposite of what the Darwinists asserted. Nietzsche, however, goes even further. To him, will to power does not mean at all that which it is usually taken to imply; and also to grow, live and beget. Nietzsche asserts that living creatures are ready to risk their own life and existence for the sake of life and existence.\(^36\) This, however, Ludovici chose to pass over in silence, for evidently it did not fit in with his picture of Nietzsche.

\(^{31}\) W. KAUFMANN, op. cit. p. 256.
\(^{32}\) Loc. cit. and p. 391.
\(^{33}\) Yen-ping, Nietzsche's Teaching, p. 23.
\(^{34}\) A.M. LUDOVICI, op. cit. p. 64 and 66–67.
\(^{35}\) Ibid. p. 67.
\(^{36}\) W. KAUFMANN, op. cit. p. 213–214.
In the book *Ecce Homo* which appeared eight years after his death, Nietzsche admonishes his readers to strive and understand him properly. In his other book *Der Wille zur Macht* (*Will to Power*) he writes that his book wants only to induce men to think. He insists that the premise „will to power“ is indeed an exact expression of what he meant, but the Germans know only one meaning of the word *Macht*.

Ludovici failed completely to grasp the meaning of the expression „will to power“. And evidently Mao Tun did not grasp it either. Only, in contrast to Ludovici, Mao Tun criticizes Nietzsche. He understands the „will to power“ as a metamorphosis of force, authority (*ch'iang-ch'üan*). At the time Mao Tun wrote about Nietzsche, the word *ch'iang-ch'üan* was in great vogue. It is a part of the word *wu-ch'iang-ch'üan-chu-i* (*anarchism*), which Mao Tun admired. When quoting two aphorisms from the chapter „On Self overcoming“ from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, he observes that the idea of supporting authority is wrong. The two quotations in question are the following:

> Whenever I found living matter, I found will to power, and even in the servant I found the yearning to be a master.
> And further:
> Only where there is life, there is will; though not will to live, but thus I teach thee – will to power.

Mao Tun then understands will to power as a real power in its socio-political forms. Ludovici understands it as one type of strength which manifests itself in great warriors, prophets, artists and great heroes. His concept is closer to that Nietzsche had in mind. According to Nietzsche, paragons typifying will to power were philosophers, saints and artists. His ideal were men of excellent moral, gnoseological and aesthetic qualities, while the pathos of heroism was totally foreign to him. Nietzsche detested CARLYLE.

Mao Tun was of the opinion that Nietzsche's evolutionary views were misguided. And he likewise condemned the views of social Darwinists. In fact, he did not believe in the possibility of human civilization being achieved, or in the advent of an anarchist society, which in 1919–1920 was his ideal, if the life is but a forceful example of the principle of a „struggle for existence“.

„In my opinion“, wrote Mao Tun, „Kropotkin's words are the most verific. On the basis of his study of biology, Kropotkin has shown that human life is a form

37 Ibid. p.215.
38 Loc. cit.
40 See note No.45.
42 A. M. LUDOVICI, op.cit. p.68.
43 W. KAUfMANN, op.cit. p.270.
44 Ibid. p.272.
of mutual assistance, evolution is possible only in virtue of mutual assistance, and
the evolution theory in Kropotkin's works is the most satisfactory of all evolution
theories."\(^{45}\)

Mao Tun's faith in Kropotkin and his conviction that the future of mankind
lies in the realization of mutual assistance and not in some mutual competition,
or in the efforts of supermen, prevented him from sympathizing with Nietzsche
to any greater extent.

He could not bring himself to sympathize with the idea of a superman in whom
he saw, inter alia, the greatest concentration of the will to power. Mao Tun, even
more than Ludovici, was influenced by the Darwinist apprehension of the super-
man.

At one place in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, Nietzsche asks (quoted according to
Ludovici's translation): „How is man surpassed?“ It may be that Mao Tun did not
understand the text and it probably never occurred to him that he translated this
expression quite differently from what Nietzsche had written. His translation
reads: „How can man surpass people who had been before him?“ Only an instinct
influenced by Darwinism could inspire him such a thought which ultimately dis-
torted Nietzsche's message.\(^{46}\)

Similarly as Ludovici, Mao Tun also quotes other works from the „Prologue“
to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* immediately after the above quotation:

All beings in your genealogical ladder have created something beyond
themselves, and are ye going to be the ebb of this great tide? Behold, I teach
you Superman.

After this quotation Mao Tun observes briefly:

Superman is Nietzsche's evolution theory.\(^{47}\)

Would Mao Tun then belong among those whom Nietzsche disparagingly
classified as „scholarly oxen“? It is difficult to say! And even more were it so, it
was a case of invincible ignorance in his case and Mao Tun could not help it. He
presumed superman to be more than man, but he never mentioned that man was
to superman what monkey is to man. He thought that a revaluation of all values
would create a superman\(^{48}\) which is quite an arresting thought – but he never
expounded it in any detail. Similarly as Ludovici, so also Mao Tun was conscious
of the fact that much can be made out of man „through a favourable accumulation
and augmentation of human powers and arrangements“.\(^{49}\) But the concept of su-
perman remained hazy to the one and the other – neither of them stated what
exactly they understood by this term.

\(^{47}\) Loc.cit.
\(^{48}\) Yen-ping, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, p.32.
\(^{49}\) A. M. LUDOVICI, op.cit. p.73.
Ludovici translated the German word *überwinden* by the term „to surpass“ while W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale used the equivalent „to overcome“ which alone does justice to the meaning with which Nietzsche wished to imbue it. As we have seen, Mao Tun translated this English word correctly using the term *ch'ao-yüeh*\(^5\), but he arbitrarily interpreted the context thereby altering essentially the meaning of the message.

In the „Prologue“ to *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, we find:

> I teach you the Übermensch. Man is something that should be overcome (*überwunden*). What have you done in order to overcome him?\(^5\)

According to Kaufmann, supermann „at any rate cannot be dissociated from the conception of Überwindung, of overcoming“. Only the man that overcomes himself can become an overman.\(^5\)

The word *überwinden* has in Nietzsche a moral content. It occurs frequently, and KLAGES, one of the most eminent scholars of Nietzsche's works speaks about an *Überwindungsmotiv* and devotes to it a whole chapter of his book.\(^5\) The principle of overcoming is an important element in Nietzsche's philosophy. It is connected with its principal premises, is their determining condition. Thus, for example, the central conception of Nietzsche's later thought, the will to power, is inseparably associated with overcoming: „A table of virtues hangs over every people. Behold, it is the table of their overcomings, behold, it is the virtue of their will to power.“\(^5\)

The will to power, therefore, essentially means nothing more than the will to overcome and not to surpass oneself. Self-overcoming is the essence of a moral codex.

At one place in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, we find:

> … and life itself confided this secret to me: „Behold“, it said, „I am that which must always overcome itself“ \(^5\)

To this W. Kaufmann observes that „the will to power is a striving which cannot be accurately described either as a will to affect others or as a will to realize oneself: it is essentially a striving to transcend and perfect oneself;“\(^5\) And at another place: „„Power“ means something specific for Nietzsche: self overcoming.“\(^5\)

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\(^5\) Ibid. p.71.

\(^5\) W. KAUFMANN, op. cit. p.268. The original text see *Also sprach Zarathustra*, p.8.

\(^5\) W. KAUFMANN, op. cit. p.268.


\(^5\) W. KAUFMANN, op. cit. p.173 and *Also sprach Zarathustra*, p.61–62.

\(^5\) *Also sprach Zarathustra*, p.124.

\(^5\) W. KAUFMANN, op. cit. p.215.

\(^5\) Ibid. p.225.
In the revaluation of all values Mao Tun saw clearly the true sense of Nietzscheanism, but he did not pursue this thought any further. He saw in this revaluation also the method by which truth may be attained. Again an interesting view, but likewise left without any elaboration.

In the last chapter of his article Mao Tun treated Nietzsche as sociologist. Nietzsche's philosophy in this sphere interested him more than in that of the evolution theory. Here he distanced himself even more than Ludovici and his attitude against Nietzsche was even more evident.

Ludovici was not quite clear as to what to call Nietzsche in his relation to society. He did not consider the word “sociologist” an apt one to express the peculiarity of Nietzsche's views. Though Ludovici does not write about it explicitly, yet he was under the impression that sociological questions were of very little concern to Nietzsche. After some considerations, Ludovici calls Nietzsche an “advocate of Higher Man”. This appellation is not entirely unsuitable, even though Ludovici fancied under it something different from what Nietzsche intended to convey by his views.

Mao Tun follows Ludovici from the very beginning. The term “sociologist” as made to relate to Nietzsche presents no problem to him at all. He sets Nietzsche's ethics and evolutionary views in opposition to his sociology. While in the first two philosophical disciplines he at least partially sympathized with Nietzsche, he came out totally against him on problems related to sociology. In the first two disciplines he gave credit to Nietzsche for his iconoclastic endeavours, in the last he condemned Nietzsche's conservatism and called him “the devil among men”.

Höffding, too, wrote about Nietzsche's social dualism and Mao Tun follows in his steps. He states that according to Nietzsche, society is divided into the ruling class (the aristocracy) and those ruled over (the ordinary people), that is, he transfers ethical dualism into the social organization. Only master morality should be upheld in order that superman might be created.

Mao Tun has a fourfold reservation against Nietzsche's sociology.

Firstly, Nietzsche erred when presuming that the dualistic principle which he could conveniently apply in the sphere of thought, could equally well be used also in the material sphere, i.e. in the sphere of social organization.

Secondly, Nietzsche erred when he thought that the causes and effects of the past would be the same as the causes and effects of the future.

Thirdly, Nietzsche laid great stress on an ascending line of life and erred when he thought human nature to be bad.

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58 Yen-ping, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, p. 32.
59 Loc. cit.
60 A. M. Ludovici, op. cit. p. 75.
61 Yen-ping, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, p. 35.
Fourthly, Nietzsche erred when assuming evil to be something quite natural and not caused by society.\(^{63}\)

The last two reproaches addressed to Nietzsche show to what extent Mao Tun was then under the influence of anarchism.

The starting point in Nietzsche's sociology according to Mao Tun, is an expansion upwards.\(^{64}\) That is the reason why Nietzsche is against the principle of equality. Nietzsche, as Mao Tun states, was under the impression that the most important people in society are the outstanding and able individuals who succeed in leading mankind along the paths of evolution. These talents are to be given every possibility for an undisturbed, unthwarted evolution. They cannot be oppressed for the sake of masses. Mao Tun formulated these ideas when reading similar views by Ludovici.\(^{65}\) The latter, however, cites also the examples of these "aristocrats", which Mao Tun does not. They are Mani, Lao-tzu, Confucius, Muhammad and Jesus Christ.\(^{66}\) These are the individuals Nietzsche had in mind when speaking of higher men. They are the ones "who in their sublime arrogance actually converted man into a mirror in which they saw themselves and their doctrines reflected ...".\(^{67}\) They were men of whom it could not be said that they were aristocratic members of the governing class: they were eminent personages in world history in whom "the hopes of a real elevation of humanity may be placed ...".\(^{68}\)

Hence, Mao Tun evidently takes Nietzsche's philosophy literally. He encounters him as any other philosopher and does not realize that Nietzsche often means to convey something different from what he actually says.

We do not know what Mao Tun's opinion of Nietzsche had been before he began to study him more closely. But if he saw in him "an instrument for action" – which is very probable – then he was greatly mistaken. Nietzsche's philosophy is not for the masses at large. This is by no means because it aspired to be aristocratic, undemocratic or antisocial, but rather because through it Nietzsche meant to educate men who would overcome themselves, would become perfect. He set himself against democracy and socialism because he was under the impression that the preaching of ideas of equality thwarts the rise and growth of outstanding individuals who are the only hope of humanity. He was not concerned about the political effect, but an effect supremely ethical. Among all the great of this world, he admired mostly Goethe and Socrates.\(^{69}\)

Taking his cue from Ludovici, Mao Tun goes on to assert that according to Nietzsche, democracy and socialism are two institutions that serve to enslave
people.\footnote{A. M. LUDOVICI, op. cit. p.79–80 and Yen-ping, Nietzsche's Teaching, p.37.} In these institutions every individual, wise or silly, may get the highest powers into his hands. And when pointing to Nietzsche's conviction that socialism is nothing but a realization of the Christian ideal according to which all men are equal, he observes that such talk is not even worth being argued about. At the close of 1919 and the beginning of 1920, Mao Tun was an ardent and enthusiastic adherent of democracy and socialism of anarchistic orientation. He wrote that a pure and narrow-intentioned democracy carries numerous drawbacks and limits and further, that an orthodox or State socialism owes much to despotism, and is an obstruction to men of outstanding talent. Despite this, he considered Nietzsche's attacks as unjust and his judgements as arbitrary talk.\footnote{Yen-ping, Nietzsche's Teaching, p.37.}

Mao Tun did not object even to an „ascending line“ after which Nietzsche was striving: what he did object to, however, was that Nietzsche considered the aristocratic – this is understood to mean a politically aristocratic – organization to be one most suitable for assuring and carrying through this endeavour. He reproaches Nietzsche with having hypertrophied the significance of social organization, and speaks of him as being under the impression that progress of mankind and an „ascending line“ are closely related to social organization. If equality is on the same level for all in the social organization, people are equal, and this makes progress impossible. Mao Tun affirmed that organization is something external, while the progress of mankind resides in creative force. Creative force is an inner virtue and has nothing in common with social organization.\footnote{Ibid. p.38.}

In the light of what precedes it appears as a paradox to note that what Mao Tun stated, resembled somewhat to the aim Nietzsche had in view. Social organization interested him in the measure in which it could contribute to the formation of the perfect man – to the formation of the highest specimens – as he himself puts it.\footnote{F. NIETZSCHE, Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen, Leipzig 1930, p.177.} Thus, for instance, treating of culture as a summary of the life of human society and of both the material and spiritual values of this society, Nietzsche says:

This is the basic idea of culture in so far as it assigns only one task to every single of us: to promote inside and outside of ourselves the generation of the philosopher, the artist and the saint, and thus to work at the perfection of nature.\footnote{Ibid. p.248–249.}

Nietzsche likewise believed in the creative force. The will to power is one of the manifestations of this force. W. Kaufmann writes at one place about O. WILDE and his poem in prose entitled „The Artist“. The artist wishes to make a bronze statue, but cannot find a piece of bronze in the whole world. He therefore melts down his work and uses it anew. „This seemed to Nietzsche the essence of
creativity and the way of all life“, Kaufmann added.\(^{75}\) However, what Nietzsche exactly imagined under it, will be seen in a subsequent part of this article.

Mao Tun claimed that views such as those Nietzsche expressed in the domain of sociology, should not exist at all in the times of democracy.\(^{76}\)

The postulate that produced the greatest impression on Mao Tun and the Chinese in general, from Nietzsche's entire work, is that of revaluation of all values. Ludovici presents a few sentences from Nietzsche's *Antichrist* to the reader at the end of the last chapter of the book. He abstains from commenting on them and only states that they represent „the moral code wherewith he would transvalue our present values.“\(^{77}\)

They are the following sentences:

What is good? – All that increases the feeling of power, will to power, power itself in man.
What is bad? – All that proceeds from weakness.
What is happiness? – The feeling that power increases, that resistance is overcome.
Not contentedness, but more power: not peace at any price, but warfare: not virtue, but capacity /virtue in the Renaissance style, virtue free from any moral acid/.\(^{78}\)

In contrast to Ludovici, Mao Tun expounds these words. Immediately after quoting them, he writes:

On seeing the sentences just quoted, we know Nietzsche beyond good and evil. His revaluation of all values is just this. In this manner he worships force …\(^{79}\)

Ultimately, even that in which he placed his great hopes seemed to be inadequate to Mao Tun. He was too deeply determined by the time in which he lived and the knowledge he was able to acquire.

From the epilogue of Mao Tun's article it ensues that he considered Nietzsche to have been a great philosopher. But he also declared that there were dangerous streaks in him. In his philosophy, just as in that of every thinker, he only saw the means that were to help attain two goals: changes in the life of society, and the achievement of truth. When in his view this did not seem to be the ideal means, he ceased to take note of Nietzsche altogether.

The first number of the second volume of the journal *People's Bell* came out in August of 1920. The entire number was devoted to Nietzsche's life and work. The editor-in-chief of this journal, the philosopher Li Shih-ch'en[27] (1892–1935),

\(^{75}\) W. KAUFMANN, op. cit. p. 216.
\(^{77}\) A. M. LUDOVICI, op. cit. p. 86.
\(^{78}\) Loc. cit.
\(^{79}\) Yen-ping, *Nietzsche's Teaching*, p. 41–42.
wrote the most important of the contributions, entitled „Ni ts'ai ssu-hsiang-chih p'i-p'an“[28] (Criticism of Nietzsche's Philosophy).\(^{80}\) This is simultaneously the most important study among all the articles devoted to Nietzsche's work and forming the framework of the present study.

An essential difference between Mao Tun's and Li Shih-ch'en's contribution is that the latter's refuses to be a mere introductory article and in fact is more than that. Li Shih-ch'en was a philosopher and his aim was not to acquaint readers with Nietzsche, but to explain him to them. However, similar to Mao Tun, he did not wish to propagate him either. In addition, Li Shih-ch'en was well acquainted with the Japanese material on Nietzsche and knew also the European works about him.

In his article Wo-ti sheng-huo t'ai-tu-li tzu-pai\(^{[29]}\) (A Personal Statement Regarding My Attitude to Life),\(^{81}\) Li Shih-ch'en writes that all his life (he was then 33) he had devoted himself to a study of books. On completing the age of 25 (hence, about the year 1917 or 1918), he became interested in Nietzsche's teaching, which he characterizes as a „great suggestion“\(^{82}\) and reveals that it greatly suited to his temperament. Nietzsche made a deep impression on him and his teaching became part of Li Shih-ch'en's life outlook. Li Shih-ch'en certainly was an uncommonly rare personality among the philosophers and writers of China. He lived as a Nietzschean.

Li Shih-ch'en began his article „Criticism of Nietzsche's Philosophy“ referred to above, with the observation that even before being acquainted with Nietzsche's philosophy the Chinese execrated Nietzsche, swore at him and were unjust towards him. Nietzsche had succeeded in stirring the stolid, phlegmatic temperament of the Chinese people.

This article, too, saw the light of the day at the time when pragmatism scored its great successes in China and therefore it is not surprising that Li Shih-ch'en should try to pass Nietzsche for a representative of pragmatism, taking authority for this from the above-mentioned book by Thilly. Li Shih-ch'en does not explicitly state why Nietzsche was condemned in China. He only observes on a general plane that Nietzsche was considered to be the man responsible for the world war that raged between 1914 and 1918. Therefore, his teaching is dangerous. Views such as these were fairly current among scholars investigating Nietzsche's work in England and France. Li Shih-ch'en refutes this view and makes use of Dewey's arguments from the book German Philosophy and Politics. In this book Dewey has in fact asserted that Kantianism „has helped to formulate a sense of a national mission and destiny“\(^{83}\) – concerning Germany of course – and in this domain

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80 P.1–28.
This article was written on the New Year's Day of 1924.
82 Ibid. p.19.
83 J. DEWEY, German Philosophy and Politics, p.29.
FICHTE and Hegel took contact with it. As far as Nietzsche's philosophy was concerned, J. Dewey was of the opinion that nothing similar could be explained by it, and that it is but a „superficial and transitory wave of opinion“.⁸⁴

According to Li Shih-ch'en, the starting point for Nietzsche's philosophy is Schopenhauer's principal premise of the will to live (Wille zum Leben). Only in Nietzsche, this will is not will to live, but will to power.⁸⁵ Here, Li Shih-ch'en follows the views current at the time when he wrote his study. Recent investigations have shown something different, nevertheless, as this is of no substantial import to the article presented to the readers, we shall refrain from following up this issue.

From our point of view, of more interest are Li Shih-ch'en's opinions on „the will to power“ itself. He divides this expression into two components. The first of them is will. It is meant to express strength that emanates from the interior and possesses a rational and spiritual colouring. The second component is strength. It has a fighting and subjugating character. It is „a living strength, life strength, a self-directing strength that renews itself and helps growth, subjugates and creates. Every phenomenon, every motion and all patterns are symptoms of the will to power“.⁸⁶

It is possible to agree with what he said about will to power. It should nevertheless be observed that he forgot that Überwindungsmotiv of Nietzsche's philosophy. The will to power is truly a fundamental force that manifests itself in the most diverse manners and creates from itself all that exists. However, we must stress in the very first place that it is a „striving which cannot be accurately described as a will to affect others, or as a will to ‘realize’ oneself; it is essentially a striving to transcend and perfect oneself“,⁸⁷ as has already been shown earlier. This does not apply solely to man, as might appear from the quotation. It applies likewise to all phenomena of the material and spiritual world. The will to power is dualistically effective.⁸⁸ It is something that overcomes, and also something that is overcome (überwunden). It is something like the Absolute Idea of Hegel.

When Li Shih-ch'en writes about Nietzsche's relation to Darwin, we see that he understood the matter better than either Ludovici or Mao Tun. He shows how very far Nietzsche is from a Darwinistic understanding of nature and man. „Struggle for existence“, or „natural selection“ is of no importance to Nietzsche, but only that which is essential in beings – the inner creative force. Darwin put too much accent on what is exterior. It is precisely under conditions of the „survival of the fittest“ that those who win are the least worthy of it. Nietzsche was not interested in an elevation of the species, but according to Li Shih-ch'en, he was

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⁸⁴ Ibid. p.28.
⁸⁵ Li Shih-ch'en, Criticism of Nietzsche's Philosophy, p.4.
⁸⁶ Ibid. p.7.
⁸⁸ Ibid. p.206.
interested in ego (tzu wo\textsuperscript{31}), self-realization.\textsuperscript{89} Li Shih-ch'en does not show that Nietzsche qualified people. Not every man is capable of successful self-realization.

Li Shih-ch'en showed quite clearly that superman cannot be understood or explained biologically and that man is not a transition between animal and superman. Superman is a symbol: a symbol of an evolutionary progress of mankind, a symbol of humanity's hope. These too, are Li Shih-ch'en's words.\textsuperscript{90} However, he said little by them to convey a lucid image of the superman to the reader. And this lade of lucidity about Nietzsche's superman was precisely one of the main reasons why Nietzsche failed to be understood in China.

According to Li Shih-ch'en, aristocratism is nothing more than the cult of the real man. Disdain of the vulgar man is a logical corollary. „The vulgar man frequently holds a position of importance in society, while „the noble man“ often occupies a humble post. Those esteemed as heroes by „common sense“, the great, need not be noble. And those considered as silly and good-for-nothing need not be either the one or the other. Nietzsche does not use the words „noble“, „strong“ in their currently-accepted sense, but as ex-pressing the inner substance of life. Nietzsche understands „aristocratism“ in the moral sense.\textsuperscript{91} Li Shih-ch'en goes so far as to imbue this understanding with a cosmic-moral tincture when he writes that every man capable of existing freely unifies, makes himself one with the universe.\textsuperscript{92} It is thus that a true, real man is born.

It is only natural that Li Shih-ch'en should also have become interested in the revaluation of all values in the domain of religion, morals, philosophy and art. They are to be revaluated because they are an obstacle to discussion, intercourse. Like Nietzsche, Li Shih-ch'en, too, looks upon this process as an implementation of the principles of nihilism. Nihilism in Nietzsche's interpretation is nothing but a long-term process in which old values are being depreciated. Everything becomes devaluated in this process.\textsuperscript{93} To be a nihilist is nothing contemptible.

Li Shih-ch'en was tributary of his epoch and therefore devoted considerable attention to those philosophical -isms that were then in vogue: intuitivism, voluntarism and instinctivism. He was much taken up in this article with problems associated with such a controversial term as instinct. He saw reality and the axiological issues related to it, in the light of a criticism of instinctivism. He put together the problem of explaining values and the herd instinct. The highest pattern of masses is herd instinct. If the individual is oppressed then the honour to the mankind is shown. Li Shih-ch'en does not agree with this statement. According to him the herd instinct has its drawbacks. Man must not be dependent on herd instinct but on his self. It is necessary to give approval to „ego“, to man who

\textsuperscript{89} Li Shih-ch'en, Criticism of Nietzsche's Philosophy, p.8–9.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid. p.11.
\textsuperscript{91} Cf. KAUFMANN, p. 247–248.
\textsuperscript{92} LI Shih-ch'en, Criticism of Nietzsche's Philosophy, 18.
\textsuperscript{93} Cf. ibid. p.16 and F. NIETZSCHE, Der Wille zur Macht, Leipzig 1930, p.10.
by himself dominates (chēng-fú\(^{32}\)) and creates something.\(^{94}\) The question is, what did Li Shih-ch'ên understand under this „domination“? He probably had in mind the connotation implied in the English „surpass“ rather than „overcome“. The act of submission by force, and creation – with ego being the moving force: this stood highest on the table of values. Li Shih-ch'ên does not explicitly state this, but it ensues from his entire conception. This knowledge is the source of that individualism which was currently ascribed in China to Nietzsche.

The problem of Nietzsche's relation to art should also – according to Li Shih-ch'ên – be viewed in the light of this individualism. The passage in which Li Shih-ch'ên writes on these issues is probably the most interesting in the whole article and certainly the one most influenced by the spirit of the times. In it Li Shih-ch'ên states that Nietzsche considered art to be more important than knowledge or morals. According to Nietzsche – in reality rather according to Li Shih-ch'ên – there is a great difference between morality, knowledge and life on the one hand, and art and life, on the other. Knowledge and morality exert a retardative effect on life, art makes it more dynamic. Knowledge and morality paralyze life. They act like poison if a sane boundary is passed. Art does not paralyze, it only vivifies, exerts a stimulating influence. Art is therefore a saving light-house, the protection of humanity from a scientific and moral poison.\(^{95}\) Li Shih-ch'ên does not even indicate where he drew such ideas.

In the aesthetic domain Li Shih-ch'ên did not confine himself to have recourse only to Nietzsche. He studied H. BERGSON, further the work of the Japanese philosopher, aesthetician WATSUJI Tetsurō\(^{33}\) (born in 1889), and E. CARPENTER.

In another article called „I-shu-lun“\(^{34}\) (Theory of Art) Li Shih-ch'ên comes with the idea that the highest mission of art is to be a creative flame of life for the creators and consumers. In the present period it must stimulate life, show up its capabilities and possibilities.\(^{96}\) Life and art are mutually closely related. They must not drift apart. Writing about Nietzsche he states that Nietzsche held life in high esteem and even considered art to be life.\(^{97}\)

Li Shih-ch'ên's views are very interesting. He asserts that life is an incessant „self-creation“ (tzu-wo ch'uang-tsao\(^{35}\)), an effort at „self-expression“ (tzu-wo piao-hsien\(^{38}\)).\(^{98}\) The life of drunken frenzy (Dionysian frenzy) is nothing but a continuous creation and incessant „self-widening“ (tzu-wo shen-chang\(^{37}\)), and both these, through self-expressive will to power, are the aim of expression.\(^{99}\) That which is expressed by means of self-expressive will to power, is true art. The basis of art is the will to power.\(^{100}\)

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\(^{94}\) Li Shih-ch'ên, *Criticism of Nietzsche's Philosophy*, p. 18.
\(^{95}\) Ibid. p. 22.
\(^{96}\) *Li Shih-ch'ên's Lectures*, p. 107
\(^{97}\) Loc. cit.
\(^{99}\) Loc. cit.
\(^{100}\) Loc. cit.

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Li Shih-ch'en's conclusion ensues from this, quite logically:

Life must forcibly strive at self-expression. Self-expression is the basis of creative endeavour.\(^{101}\)

The question of self-expression is one of the basic issues in Chinese literary and artistic criticism of the twenties of this century. This is an important but also a complex problem. Its origin goes back probably to ancient Chinese Taoist philosophy – or to that influenced by Taoism – but similarly to other cases, Chinese men of letters or philosophers preferred to call on European, American or Japanese authors as arguers.\(^{102}\) When writing in more detail about self-expression, Li Shih-ch'en takes no note of the old Chinese tradition, e.g. that derived from Chuang-tzu or Meng-tzu, but takes up one of Carpenter's books to explain the essence of self-expression.

But before coming to Carpenter, he had stopped with Bergson: and looked into his books *Creative Evolution* (L'Évolution créative) and *Laughter* (Le Rire). From Bergson he deduces that „the true face of reality“ is individual (Bergson speaks about individuality of things and beings) and to express precisely this individuality is „the loftiest ambition“\(^{103}\) of the artists. The greater the sincerity (cheng-chih-hsing\(^{138}\)) of a work, the more evident also is its individuality, and the wider its infectiousness (kan-ying-hsing\(^{139}\)).\(^{104}\) This last sentence, however, is a distortion of Bergson's critical message. Similarly to the thought that art is individual, and without individuality (ko-hsing\(^{40}\)) there is no art.

As far as we know, Bergson does not speak of self-expression. He wants art to express the individuality of things or beings, i.e. their inherent attributes, peculiarities which would otherwise remain distant to us if we wished to know them rationally only. There is a veil between them and us, that prevents us from coming to know that individuality of things or beings. The artist still helps us to remove this veil.\(^{105}\) According to Bergson not the scientist, but the artist is the one who penetrates to reality. „The loftiest ambition“ of art consists „in revealing to us nature“. However, when he writes about artists „who retire within themselves“, and then „contrive to make us see something of what they have seen“,\(^{106}\) he may have in mind something that may be called also self-expression.

During his stay in Japan Li Shih-ch'en became acquainted with the work of Watsuji Tetsurô, who had written a book on Nietzsche called *On Nietzsche* (Nietzsche kenkyû) and who was a member of the then well-known literary society White Birch School (Shirakaba\(^{41}\)). J. K. YAMAGIWA characterizes its members in these terms:

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104 Ibid. p. 106.
106 Ibid. p. 100.

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Some of these writers held that man and the universe were one, and the development of each individual man, contributing to the whole humanity, made the universe richer. Others felt that the human race was ever reaching for a higher destiny and that man contributed most by striving for his own perfection. The emphasis was on man's relationship with the whole of humanity, with very little attention paid to 'society'.

Among them we find the principal representative of this group, MUSHANOKÔJI Saneatsu[42] (born in 1885), very often translated into Chinese. This man felt convinced that everything he did, knew or strove after, were but means serving to develop his personality. He was concerned with extending the boundaries of his ego, hence, something that Li Shih-ch'ên termed 'self widening'.

In the last year of 19th century E. Carpenter published a book of essays entitled *Angel's Wings*, the last of which is called 'The Art of Life'. In it Carpenter expressed his conviction that 'the evolution of the Fine Arts during the period of civilization is leading up in the present time towards their amalgamation again with actual Life, and towards the reconstruction of Life itself as a thing of beauty, and indeed the greatest of the arts'.

He then writes that 'life is expression' and this sentence recurs like a musical motif, repeatedly – even in an altered form – throughout his article. 'Life is expression' is to Carpenter the same as 'Life is Art.' Naturally, between these two premises there is the sign of equality. This then means that Art, too, is expression.

The premise 'life is expression' is rather general. If it is to convey anything in the domain which Carpenter has in mind, it must be applied to the individual, the bearer of this expressivity. Hence, according to him, one of the things to remember is that 'Life must be an expression of one's Self'. And since Life is Art, art is – whether it is or will be depends on the creator – 'an expression of himself', hence, of the creator himself.

Carpenter begins with life as an expression and then explains art as self-expression (though he does not use this term). Li Shih-ch'ên uses the term and begins precisely with it. He is interested, in the first place, in the question of self-expression as the essence of artistic creation, and only then in life. The results, however, are the same. There is a concordance of views between the two.

Li Shih-ch'ên writes thus:

... the essence of art resides in self-expression. This was true in primeval ages. The more expressive the art, the greater the value of life. Life is in


110 Ibid. p.211, 214 and 219.

111 Ibid. p.219.

112 Ibid. p.211.

113 Ibid. p.217.
fact movement passing from inside out. If it is expressed wrongly, then the goal of man himself is wrong. If thoughts and feelings of the individual cannot be developed and life is passive, is it not a slave's life?114

The fulfilment of life may be the background of self-expression. It is necessary to develop love towards the family, to create rationally and diligently, to create „round oneself an external world which answers to the world within …“ This is what both Carpenter and Li Shih-ch'en call „fullness of Life“115 (sheng-ming-chih ch'ung-shih\(^{[43]}\)).

Life is art according to Carpenter and Li Shih-ch'en. Is it also according to Nietzsche? Li Shih-ch'en follows Nietzsche to some extent when he asserts that feelings of beauty are produced both by moments of sexual excitement and by good food. Procreation and creation are essentially one and the same thing.116 Without freedom of movement there is no feeling of beauty. Li Shih-ch'en strongly condemned aestheticism and l'art-pour-l'artism precisely because he did not believe that art could exist while remote from life.117

Bergson, Watsuji Tetsurô and Carpenter represented rather helpers in need. Li Shih-ch'en truly turned his eyes intently towards Nietzsche. In this respect he certainly was an exception among Chinese philosophers.

When in his article which we have just analyzed, he wished to explain Nietzsche, it seems that in his lecture „Ni-ts'ai ssu-hsiang yü wu-jen-chih sheng-huo“\(^{[44]}\) (Nietzsche's Philosophy and My Life),118 he also meant to propagate him:

„Our life is very dreary and our happiness very poor“, he wrote at its beginning. „It is enough to remember what we have gone through in life … This year is the same, the next will be the same, and the one coming after it will not differ. Why is an individual's life so grey and the life of the country so monotonous? What is the reason? It is because we lack a creative spirit, there are no ambitions in us to alter our life. If we wish to acquire a creative spirit and alter our life, we must find a teaching that has an affinity to such a change and study it.“119

This teaching, according to Li Shih-ch'en, is Nietzsche's teaching. He considered it as the most powerful ideological weapon that would help alter the life of China.120

It might be interesting to compare Mao Tun and Li Shih-ch'en in so far as the question of a utilitarian application of Nietzsche's teaching is concerned.

\(^{114}\) Li Shih-ch'en, Theory of Art, p. 108 and E. Carpenter, Angel's Wings, p. 211.
\(^{116}\) W. KAUFMANN explains NIETZSCHE's view in another way: „… procreation need not be a senseless continuation of an essentially meaningless story and an addition of more zeros – it can really be creation.“ (p. 269) Cf. Li Shih-ch'en, Criticism of Nietzsche's Philosophy, p. 27.
\(^{117}\) Li Shih-ch'en, Criticism of Nietzsche's Philosophy, p. 25.
\(^{118}\) Li Shih-ch'en's Lectures, p.136–143.
\(^{119}\) Ibid. p.137.
\(^{120}\) Ibid. p.128.
Mao Tun looked upon Nietzsche's teaching as on an instrument for action only before he began to study it, eventually, for some time until he came to know it better. Li Shih-ch'en, on the other hand, believed Nietzsche until he undertook his journey to Europe in 1928. After that he became a convinced Marxist. As he had begun to be interested in Nietzsche about the year 1917, he was Nietzschean for a whole decade. It should be observed that initially he did not adopt Nietzscheanism on the basis of utilitarian considerations. These influenced him powerfully only sometime after the year 1923.

In this lecture Li Shih-ch'en explains Nietzsche's teaching in a considerably pragmatic manner. He explains the will to power as man's „hidden force“, as a „living power“ that is incessantly renewed. It is a self-reliant and endless power. Only if man possesses this power can his abilities develop. If in Li Shih-ch'en's preceding article the reply to the question: what do the terms *cheng-fu*, i.e. to dominate and *ch'uang-tsao*, i.e. to create, mean, proved inadequate, in this lecture he expressed himself very clearly. According to him, the action of the will to power can be utilized in two areas: in dominating the environment and in creating the environment. Men are dominated by the milieu. Hence, life is dreary, grey. If it is to be changed, we must influence the milieu and alter it.

But, of course, Li Shih-ch'en, just as Mao Tun before him, failed to apprehend the fact that Nietzsche is not a social philosopher and that when speaking of creation he was not concerned at all with environment but with the creation of new, especially ethical and aesthetic values. In 1919 Mao Tun translated this passage from *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*:

> Little do people comprehend the great, that it is the creating … Far from the market place and from fame happens all that is great: far from the market place and from fame the inventors of new values have always dwelt.

Mao Tun either made no note of these words or he had forgotten them when writing about Nietzsche under the influence of the „tough Nietzschean“ A.M. Ludovici. And yet these words are part of the bequest that Nietzsche has made to mankind. Among the Chinese Lu Hsün alone took a good note of them.

Li Shih-ch'en was a „tender Nietzschean“: to a certain extent he idealized Nietzsche and made him into the prophet of a splendid future and an apostle of human individualism. Nietzsche was to him a paradigm of perfection, his life a model of a future fruitful life, and expression of a real „fullness of life“.

Li Shih-ch'en similar to the Japanese members of the White Birch School, paid very little attention to society. In his philosophical writings he often uses the words individual, humanity, universe, but rarely the word society. In this lecture

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121 O. Brière, op.cit. p. 22.
123 Ibid. p. 138–139.
124 Ibid. p. 139.
125 See the translation of this passage in W. Kaufmann, op.cit. p. 354.
he speaks of milieu, environment, which embodies also society, but his programme of its „domination“ or „creation“ is declarative and lacks concreteness. His philosophical message is interesting for investigators and might even have been attractive to the reader of the early twenties. However, a milieu cannot possibly be reformed on the basis of an individual’s wishing when no concrete programme is at hand to implement such wishings. Self-expression, self-widening, self-realization and self-creation as social programmes just proved deplorable. It is true that it is not possible to reform society without first reforming the individual, but a reform alone of the individual is inadequate to assure or impose a social reform. In this lecture addressed to the University students, Li Shih-ch'en said very little. Many of the items had already been mentioned in his first article. He did not unfold his idea of social reform, nor did he improve on his explanation of the term superman. He declared that superman is the „pathos of distance“. It is something like when a twentieth century man looks back upon a man from the fifteenth century, or a civilized man upon a barbarian. Only this feeling in the superman is far stronger. It is fairly hard to understand these words. We shall understand them better if we take a brief note of Li Shih-ch'en's original characteristic of the superman. Here, too, he mentions the pathos of distance. Nietzsche affirmed that modern European has a far smaller value than a European from the Renaissance age. By this he wished to show that humanity „does not represent a development towards something better and stronger and higher“ in the sense of Darwinists. He thereby meant that the occurrence of Übermensch was at all time possible. Supermen or overmen were to have been „truly human beings and no longer animals“, the most outstanding individuals: the philosophers, artists and saints, men with extraordinary moral and creative qualities.

And as we again deal with superman, these is one more point that should be mentioned. Nietzsche connects the theory of the superman with the concept of eternal recurrence (die ewige Wiederkehr). This concept represents the climax of his philosophy.

In Li Shih-ch'en, eternal recurrence is considered as something that „de presses to a minimum the meaning of superman“. If the superman is not interested in any other except the present and real world, and his Weltanschauung is destructive, war-like, progressive, and is marked by a spirit of resistance, then the idea of eternal recurrence is superfluous. A superman would be of no avail if that what he performed should become the same as it had been before. If the sense of the will to power is to dominate and create, and universe war also moulded by it, then the existence of the eternal recurrence is impossible.

This reasoning is quite logical, but the premises are false. The Übermensch according to Nietzsche is not such as Li Shih-ch'en imagined him, but one who

126 Li Shih-ch'en, Nietzsche’s Philosophy and My Life, p. 139.
127 Li Shih-ch'en, Criticism of Nietzsche’s Philosophy, p. 10–11.
128 W. Kaufmann, op. cit. p. 270.
129 Li Shih-ch'en, Criticism of Nietzsche’s Philosophy, p. 26–27.
had overcome his animal nature, ordered his passions and created his own character: it is an aesthetically and ethically perfect man. The will to power is, according to Nietzsche, a force that does not dominate, but one that overcomes its own self, and when it does overcome itself, then it is overcome (überwunden). For example, impulse and reasons are expressions of the will to power. When reason triumphs over impulse, it is nothing else but a self-overcoming of the will to power.\footnote{130}

For Li Shih-ch'\text{e}n as well as for many other evolutionists believing in the idea of a gradual progress, the concept of an eternal recurrence was unacceptable. Not, however, to Nietzsche, who refused to believe in such progress. Nietzsche considered this concept as the „most scientific“ of all hypotheses claiming to explain a future existence or nonexistence of phenomena or things existing in the present or the past.\footnote{131} He took as his starting point his own conviction that if a finite universe and finite amount of energy exist in an infinite time, then only a finite number of configurations of this energy is possible.

Li Shih-ch'\text{e}n belonged to the outstanding Chinese philosophers of the twenties, even though Chinese historians failed to emphasize the fact. O. Brière writes of him as a thinker who surpassed his rivals.\footnote{132}

Nietzsche's views formed the core of Li Shih-ch'\text{e}n's conceptions also in individual philosophical disciplines. However, a consideration of these aspects would require more space than is available to this article.

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Contributions to the Nietzsche's issue of People's Bell were also made by other authors besides Li Shih-ch'\text{e}n, and two of them deserve special attention. Both wrote under the pseudonyms: S. T. W. is the author of „Ni-ts'ai hsüeh-shuo chenchia“\footnote{133} (The True Value of Nietzsche's Teaching), and Pai Shan\footnote{134} wrote the article „Ni-ts'ai chuan“ (Nietzsche's Life).

It is difficult to identify the Chinese philosopher hiding under the pseudonym S. T. M. Was it perhaps Li Shih-ch'\text{e}n's friend Wu Chih-chüeh?\footnote{135}

S. T. M.'s views on Nietzsche differed from those held by Li Shih-ch'\text{e}n. They had in common their faith in evolution. S. T. M. upheld, for the most part, Darwin's teaching and was closer to instinctivism.

S. T. M. states that Nietzsche was influenced by Darwin's book, Origin of Species when formulating his concept of the superman and the eternal recurrence.\footnote{136} And more than that. Nietzsche is reported also to have recognized even Darwin's
theory of evolution. S.T.M. understands superman purely biologically. The will to power will produce a superman who „will surpass mankind“. „Contemporary mankind“, S.T.M. writes in Nietzsche's name, „is nothing but animals. It is nothing but a transition to superman“. However, he does not make out of Nietzsche a simple repeater of Darwin's thoughts. He shows that Nietzsche does not recognize the struggle for life in Darwin's interpretation. He also criticized the evolutionists' (i.e. H. Spencer's) principle according to which life is only „an adjustment of internal relations to external relations“. According to Nietzsche (again in S.T.M.'s interpretation), this adjustment manifests itself precisely in the opposite way. The will to power which is present in living organisms, attacks the external milieu and thereby develops and changes.

After what has been said, it will not surprise us to learn that S.T.M. also sees in Nietzsche an active individualist, a destroyer of idols in the domain of religion, philosophy, science, sociology, etc. The superman's morality is likewise individualistic. S.T.M. reiterates Li Shih-ch'en's statement on the different effect of morals, knowledge and art of life. Morals and knowledge, according to him also, paralyze life, while art enables it to move upwards, to attain its peak and transform it. Thus, the creator himself, through his own strength, becomes a work of art.

Pai Shan's article, „Nietzsche's Life“ is of interest primarily because it was written principally on the basis of the „Prologue“ to Watsuji Tetsurô's book On Nietzsche. True, the author of this article consulted also the book written by A.M. Ludovici, and analysed above, but our study shows that this did not go beyond taking over some bibliographic data. The messages of Pai Shan's article and Ludovici's book are different.

This may be seen already in the first line of the article. While Ludovici saw in Nietzsche an amoralist, a moralist, an evolutionist and a sociologist, Pai Shan, and in all probability Watsuji Tetsurô also, saw in him an extreme individualist, evolutionist, the preacher of a new morality and a new art.

There is no need to underline that these are very diverse pictures. Speaking in Hegelian terms, Ludovici, and after him Mao Tun, saw – or at least could see – in Nietzsche a man whose domain was the realm of the Objective Spirit, while Watsuji Tetsurô, Li Shih-ch'en and Pai Shan saw in him a man whose domain was the realm of the Absolute Spirit.

Right at the start of his article Pai Shan warns that Nietzsche's works have an artistic colouring. Hence, individual ideas are presented differently from those in the philosophical works of other authors. For his logical deductions Nietzsche often has recourse to symbolical expressions. Contradictions in his teaching are not induced by intellectual weakness, but by enthusiasm, by a polemical orientation, by psychological dispositions. He also underlines the unity of Nietzsche's personality and its development.138

137 Loc. cit.

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Here we shall note only those views which Watsuji Tetsurô and his Chinese introducer held on precisely those two aspects which in China – with regard to Nietzsche – were at the centre of attention, i.e. Nietzsche as an individualist and theorist of art.

The author of the article devoted much space to an analysis of Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy* (*Die Geburt der Tragödie*) and to his historico-philosophical discussions *Thoughts out of Season* (*Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen*), but it would seem that the latter interested him less. This lack of interest is due to one reason, as may well be inferred. At the time of writing *The Birth of Tragedy* and later, Nietzsche held the view that a subject, if he is an artist, is redeemed from his will. It is true that a lyrical poet frequently uses the word „I“, his images are his own self, but that which he understands under the word „I“, is not the „I“ of an empirically real man. It is a real and material „I“ through which the lyrical genius penetrates to the core of all things.139 Such an „I“ could not be the creator, but only the mediator, the reflector.

Sometime in the year 1878 Nietzsche began to doubt the truth of what he had created during the preceding period and refuted it. He refuted also his views in the domain of the theory of art. In his article Pai Shan writes at length on Nietzsche's book *Human All-too-Human* (*Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*), but does not write about Nietzsche's views in the area of the theory of art. He notes the questions of *ego* in Nietzsche's philosophical concepts of the time. He asserts that according to Nietzsche, all the so-called morals, laws, rules of life should be eliminated and they should be sought only in one's self. That is real life. If would be difficult to say where the author of this article found such a thought. It is certainly not in Nietzsche's book. Only in the prologue to the first part do we find the words that man must be the goal and the measure of things,140 and in the prologue to the second part, that man should speak (and therefore also write) only when he cannot keep silent. And then he ought to discuss that what he has overcome (*man überwunden hat*).141 Nietzsche was convinced that he himself – *ego ipsissimus* –, or even his most intimate *ego* – *ego ipsissimum* –,142 was in his works. He likewise noted that part of his role is to find his way to his own self. Hence, Pai Shan knew in a large measure what Nietzsche understood under the role of *ego*, but he did not even mention that *überwinden* which forms one of the foundations of Nietzsche's philosophy, and without which Nietzsche's individualism is hardly comprehensible. Individualism had meaning to Nietzsche only in a case a concrete individual was involved, an individual that could be characterized as an „überwindendes Ich“, that is an *ego* which is able to overcome, but before all else to overcome itself, to revalue the values and create new values.

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141 Ibid. p. 3.
142 Loc. cit.
In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* there is also written about *ego* which is a „measure and value of things“ and possesses three attributes, i.e. it must be „creating, willing, evaluating“ *ego*.\(^{143}\) There we also find it written that „the individual (der *Einzelnene*) is the latest figment of contemporary civilization.“\(^{144}\) Nietzsche thinks that the *ego* of a man who signifies nothing or who does not evaluate, revalue and hence who does not create, has no value at all.

In *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* Pai Shan sees Nietzsche as the *ego* of a free spirit and a man who looks at life of universe as at his own life, his book on Zarathustra as the best book. It is a book on „life itself“, on the superman, on the eternal recurrence. Pai Shan did not look upon the teaching on the eternal recurrence with mistrust as Li Shih-ch'en did, but affirmed that Nietzsche saw in it the „highest form of Yea-Saying (*Bejahung*) to life“.\(^{145}\)

Pai Shan shows the superman in a more concrete and correct form than those spoken of until now. A Superman is one who by his *ego* – or the life of universe – tends upwards, and who by his endeavours generates new values. Life is incessantly being created and developed, and *ego* is the focus of life. Consequently also superman is the organic goal of life. Pai Shan sees the value of the book *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in that it shows how much life is terrestrial, earthly matter and looks very seriously on *ego* and on creation.\(^{146}\)

Of course, his image of the superman also fails to be sufficiently concrete and adequately to express Nietzsche's notion of superman. *Ego* was the focus of attention to Pai Shan and evidently also to Watsuji Tetsurô. *Ego* that should become superman.

Towards the end of his article, Pai Shan writes about Nietzsche's art of style. He does not mention the source of his statements but it is more than likely that he found them in *Ecce Homo*. In this book – in the section entitled „Why I Write Such Good Books“ – Nietzsche mentions the interior tension of pathos communicated by means of signs (*Zeichen*). Style is good only when it contrives to communicate to the reader the internal state of the writer or the artist.\(^ {147}\)

On reading Li Shih-ch'en's views on art, we had the impression that he did not know Nietzsche as a theorist of literature and art well enough. For example, Nietzsche never said that art is life. In his works and also in his book *Will to Live* which contains, for the most part, his notes and remarks, we find words according to which „the world is nothing else but art“,\(^ {148}\) or „the world is an artistic work that generates itself“.\(^ {149}\) Li Shih-ch'en evidently did not reach out for Nietzsche when interested in by artistic problems, but for Watsuji Tetsurô.

\(^{143}\) *Also sprach Zarathustra*, p. 32.
\(^{144}\) Ibid. p.63.
\(^{146}\) Ibid. p.14-15.
\(^{149}\) F. NIETZSCHE, *Der Wille zur Macht*, p. 533.
Watsuji Tetsurō – at least from what we know of him through Li Shih ch'en and Pai Shan –, was interested in only one part of Nietzsche's views on art. It is possible that his attention embraced this problem in all its extent, but when representing Nietzsche as an individualist, then he registered him only as author of *Human All-too-Human* and noted only the time immediately following this book, and when he spoke of him as of an artist, then he took note of him as author of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* and the following works. For instance, he never noticed the aphorisms from *Human All-too-Human* wherein art and artists are spoken of in not too laudatory terms. Art was at that time for Nietzsche only a delight to deceive (*Lust an der Lüge*), an artist was only a diligent *Handwerker*. He considered inborn talent and genius as useless. An artist as such was to him nothing more than a „backward being“.\(^{151}\)

Watsuji Tetsurō's picture of Nietzsche was likewise tendentious and transformed.

The last of the original articles in *People's Bell* devoted to Nietzsche was „Ch'ao-jen ho wei-jen“\(^{49}\) (Superman and Great Man). The author CHU Lü-yün\(^{50}\) compares in it Nietzsche's concept of a superman with MALLOCK's concept of a great man. W. H. Mallock. was the author of the book *Aristocracy and Evolution*, published in London in 1898, and in this book he clearly showed his anti-Darwinistic outlook and devoted considerable space to criticism of H. Spencer's philosophical views. Chu Lü-yün was convinced that Nietzsche was influenced by Darwin, and this was enough to make him lose all sympathy for the German thinker. He went so far as to state that according to Nietzsche, he who succeeds in keeping himself under conditions of the struggle for „the survival of the fittest“, and in the „struggle for existence“ will later become superman. A superman is not concerned with superfluous things, he is out to gain the greatest power and great victories. The superman is an expression of the mental world, the world of thought, in which he is his own goal, where his own growth and an ascending line of development are the decisive factors.

Chu Lü-yün sees Mallock's great man in a more favourable light. According to him, Mallock. does not see the goal of the great man in man himself, but in the society where this man lives. If the point of interest were only the individual, then he would only be the fittest among animals. The strength of the great man manifests itself in his influence, on others:

„The great man“ writes Mallock, „is great not in virtue of any completed results which he produces directly, by the action of his own hands, or brain, or which he exhibits in his own person, but in virtue of the completed results which he enables others to exhibit in themselves …“\(^{152}\)

Mallock writes against Spencer but does not even mention Nietzsche in his book. Chu Lü-yün made use of Mallock's theory to take up a stand both against

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151 Ibid. vol. 1, p. 143.
Spencer and Nietzsche. According to Mallock, evolution does not involve the „survival of the fittest“, but „domination by the greatest man“.\footnote{153}

Chu Lü-yün asserts that he does not fully agree neither with Mallock nor with Nietzsche. He admits the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest in the realm of the animal world and the world of men, but he underlines the differences between men and animals in the domain of acting, goal and methods. Nietzsche — deriving his theory, according to Chu Lü-yün, entirely from social Darwinism — is wrong. The superman cannot be produced through a mere struggle for existence. Mallock's great man is reportedly nearer the truth, for he is unselfish and has social progress in view. But Chu Lü-yün sees drawbacks in him also: he finds fault with the aristocratism of Mallock's great man. He gives priority to Comte's concept of humanism. In this there is no question of hero-worship, but of extolling morals. According to Lü, neither society nor the individual comes first. The ideal is to produce the necessary unity.\footnote{154}

A certain supplement to Pai Shan's article is the translation entitled „Ni ts'ai-chih i-sheng chi ch'i ssu-hsiang“\footnote{51} (Nietzsche's Life and Work), from the book by A.M. Mügge, Fr. Nietzsche, His Life and Work.\footnote{155}

The number of People's Bell devoted to Nietzsche contains two more translations: that of Nietzsche's „Prologue“ to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, by Chang Shu-tan\footnote{52}, and the translation of 100 aphorisms from the book Human All-too-Human, selected and translated by Liu Wen-ch'ao\footnote{53}.\footnote{157}

The picture presented by this number is far from uniform. Evidently, Li Shih-ch'en as the editor of the issue did not insist on the other contributors' having views on Nietzsche conformable to his own. Li Shi-ch'en's and Pai Shan's concepts were clearly influenced by Japanese views while Chu Lü-yün's was more affected by the English opinions. As to S.T.M., it is rather difficult to have any definite opinion, but his article may be said to reflect his study of both Japanese and English works on the subject. Hence, no uniform image of Nietzsche emerges from this journal, and this is a reflection of the chaotic and bewildered approach to this great figure of German philosophy in China in the years of its most fruitful encounter with the world culture.

Kuo Mo-jo\footnote{54} (born in 1892) came into contact with Nietzsche probably through German expressionists and activists, though it is equally possible that he was also influenced by Japanese conceptions when, in the first half of 1923, he decided to translate and subsequently to expound Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The first number

\footnotesize\footnote{153} Ibid. p.150.  
\footnotesize\footnote{154} Ibid. p.132.  
\footnotesize\footnote{155} P.1–46  
\footnotesize\footnote{156} P.1–18.  
\footnotesize\footnote{157} P.1–12.  

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of the literary magazine *Ch’uang-tsao chou-pao* (Creation Weekly) which appeared on May 13, 1923, carried already the first chapter of Nietzsche's masterpiece. Kuo Mo-jo did not translate the "Prologue", giving as his reason that two translations had already appeared in China. In fact, besides the translation of Chang Shu-tan referred to earlier, Lu Hsün, too, had published his translation in the 5th number of the 2nd volume of the journal *Hsin-ch’ao* (New Tide), in 1920.

By the time Kuo Mo-jo had finished the translation of the first part of the work, he received a large number of requests from his friends and readers asking him to explain the meaning of Zarathustra, for they did not understand it. His colleague and friend CH’ENG Fang-wu (born in 1894) likewise urged him to do so. Kuo Mo-jo wrote the article "Ya-yen yu tzu-li" ("Aphorisms and Own Strength"). Kuo Mo-jo did not feel competent to be the interpreter of this work written "in blood and aphorisms". According to Nietzsche, "aphorisms should be peaks, and those to whom they are spoken should be big and tall of stature". Kuo Mo-jo modestly proclaimed neither to be quite able, nor sufficiently erudite to grasp and explain the teaching of Nietzsche adequately. Kuo Mo-jo did not understand Nietzsche. And this is one of the reasons why he detached from him so soon. Immediately on leaving Nietzsche, he turned to Marx. He studied Marx's teaching first in the interpretations of Japanese Marxists, and later from Marx's own works, and very soon he became an enthusiastic Marxist.

Lu Hsün who will be the object of our interest presently, devoted attention to Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism in China when writing about the work of certain Chinese literary societies in the first half of the twenties.

According to Lu Hsün, Nietzsche aroused interest among the members of Ch'en-chung-she (The Sunken Bell Society). CH'EN Hsiang-hao, a member of this society and author of the commemorative article on it, however, makes no mention of Nietzsche at all. The present writer has no access to the pertinent material and thus is unable to express his view on the point.

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159 *Also sprach Zarathustra*, p. 41.
160 Loc. cit.
161 It was especially the work by the Japanese Marxist KAWAKAMI Hajime* Shakai shoshi to shakai kakumei* (Social Organization and Social Revolution).
162 His Marxist conviction we can see in his essays published in a book called *Mang-ch'ang-tan* (Appendicitis).
Lu Hsün likewise wrote about the society K’uang-piao-she\textsuperscript{165} (Storm and Stress Society).\textsuperscript{165} Its founder was KAO Ch’ang-hung\textsuperscript{166}, one of Lu Hsün’s pupils. Lu Hsün quotes extensively from a document published by members of this society in which they write that „the weak are unfit“ that we „must become strong in order to overcome obstacles“.\textsuperscript{166} These words appeared in February of 1925. Lu Hsün thought that the „superman“ does not speak in them as yet, but later these people „surpassed“ themselves. Their tragedy was that they failed to write and interest readers as Nietzsche had done. Therefore, their society and their journal did not last long.\textsuperscript{167}

Lu Hsün beard „Nietzsche's voice“ in the following words by HSIANG P’ei liang\textsuperscript{168}, likewise a prominent member of this society.

Why do I wish to run away from Peking? I do not need many reasons for it: In a word, – I have become weary of this old and good-for-nothing city. I have gaddled about it for four years and I am sick. of it. Here I have seen only ne’er-do-wells that only kowtowed, fawned, wanted the emperor, glorified the government. These slaves are masters at baseness, cowardice, cunning and artifice in shaking off social responsibility. I have an ugly and unpleasant taste in my mouth as if I held a stinking fish in it. I must vomit it out. Then I shall take up my stick and go.\textsuperscript{168}

It is difficult to see Nietzsche in these words, but Lu Hsün hears in them „the sounds of war drums“ and adds to them this commentary:

Nietzsche taught men to the coming of the „superman“. As he failed to appear, the preparation proved purposeless. But he himself found a way out: madness and death. If this bad not come about, he would have found himself in emptiness or would have bad to fight against it. If this bad been so, he would have lived in loneliness as the „last man“ with a heart devoid of yearning and enthusiasm, he would have looked with contempt on all power, he would have withdrawn himself and become a nihilist.\textsuperscript{169}

This passage shows us how Lu Hsün understood Nietzsche in the thirties. According to him, Nietzsche was not a nihilist, but he would have become one had not illness deprived him of reason. His Chinese followers, e. g. Hsiang P’ei-liang, were nihilists.

The present author is of the opinion that the protest of the members of Storm and Stress Society was not a Nietzschean protest, although it was a nihilistic protest according to the general interpretation. Nietzsche understood the term nihilism quite differently from Lu Hsün.

In his book Literary Debates in Modern China, A. TAGORE says that Kao Ch'ang-hung and Hsiang P’ei-liang founded in Shanghai the journal K’uang-piao chou-k’\textsuperscript{20} (Storm and Stress Weekly), in order „to bring to modern Chinese

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{165} Lu Hsün, Chung-kuo hsìn wen-hsieh ta-hsi hsiao-shuo erh-chi tao-yen, p.12–15.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{166} Ibid. p.13.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{167} Ibid. p.12–13.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{168} Ibid. p.15.}
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{169} Loc. cit.}
literature the philosophy of Nietzsche. Unfortunately, A. Tagore brings no proof to this statement. If we can believe Kao Ch'ang-hung himself, we can see from his open letter addressed to Lu Hsūn's brother CHOU Tso-jen (1885–1966) that the problem was more complex. Chou Tso-jen reproached Kao Ch'ang-hung to be steeped in Nietzschean poison, to consider himself a genius and to except everybody to kowtow to him. Kao Ch'ang-hung writes ironically that he began to be interested in Nietzsche only after he had read about Nietzschean poison from Chou Tso-jen and that he reads Nietzsche's works as works of art. In his letter he also mentions that he is very fond of one German – he does not name him – but that it is certainly not Nietzsche. However, if he bad to name ten people whom be liked best, Nietzsche would probably be among them. But here too, the reason would be solely the artistic value of his work.

The issue of Nietzsche and the members of the Storm and Stress Society from 1925 likewise remains open. It can be elucidated only on the basis of sufficient original material.

It may be responsibly stated that Nietzsche by bis *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* influenced also LIN Yū-t'ang (born in 1895), one of the most significant personalities in China after the year 1920. In the magazine *Yu-ssu* (The Chattler) he paraphrased the aphorisms of Zarathustra and in other place he recommended reading of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* to young people as one of ten most significant non-Chinese books.

Among Chinese writers, Lu Hsūn devoted most attention to a study of Nietzsche. Nietzsche began to interest him already in the first years of our century and this interest persisted through two whole decades. Here we shall analyse the views of Lu Hsūn, eventually bis work, in connection with Nietzsche only over the period 1918–1925.

In the first place it should be observed that Lu Hsūn belonged to those intellectuals who were strongly influenced by Darwinism. He believed in evolution and expressed this faith clearly and often in his articles and works of art.

In his reflexion *Sui-kan-lu* (Random Thoughts), No. 49 from the year 1919, he wrote:

I think, that the evolution of species – that is the continuation of life – is really the great part of the activity of the biological world. What is the purpose of this continuation? It is of course that of evolution.

In *Random Thoughts*, No. 41, he expressed himself in a similar manner:

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170 P. 21.
172 No. 58 /12th December, 1925/, p.1–2.
I think that the teaching on the common origin of monkey and man cannot be doubted, as a whole. But I do not understand why work had not changed all the monkeys into men, and why their descent still indulges in clownish tricks which are looked on by men. Perhaps at that time there was not a single one willing to stand up on its legs and learn human language. Or, there might have been a few such, but the monkey society set upon them and stifled them? That is perhaps why evolution could not go on.\textsuperscript{175}

And directly after this he comes to Nietzsche:

The Nietzschean superman, although very indefinite, yet, when looked upon from the reality of people living in the contemporary world, gives grounds for the belief that a nobler and more perfect humanity may appear in future.\textsuperscript{176}

This shows us that Lu Hsün, too, understood the superman, like the majority of Nietzsche's admirers in China, Darwinistically. He wrote about an indefinite superman even 15 years later – in 1935.

In this consideration, as in numerous similar works and literary studies, Lu Hsün has resort to allegories. Thus, for example, he characterizes the Chinese reality of his time by the allegory of night in which darkness reigns and only some few lights twinkle:

\begin{quote}
In this scenery there are no torches: I (\textit{wo}) am the only light. But when the torch appears, the sun rises, then we shall render homage to it and depart. And far from being grieved at this, we shall express our admiration to this torch or sun: for they will enlighten mankind and me.\textsuperscript{177}
\end{quote}

The term wo can in this context be translated by the word \textit{ego}. It is the \textit{ego} of an outstanding individual, influencing society about him.

Among such great men Lu Hsün includes Rousseau, Darwin, Stirner, Ibsen, Nietzsche and Tolstoy.\textsuperscript{178} These are iconoclasts and creators in one person. When writing about „individuals“, Lu Hsün has in mind precisely these people. Nietzsche had called them \textit{die Einzelnen} and characterized them, for instance, in chapter 12 of the first book of \textit{Thus Spoke Zarathustra}, a brief excerpt from which was quoted earlier. Lu Hsün was familiar with it.\textsuperscript{179} These \textit{Einzelnen} avoid market places and flies which represent the enemies of the lonely, but great iconoclasts and creators.

It would seem at first glimpse that Lu Hsün, too, is bound to the Japanese White Birch School by a like view of the individual (\textit{ego}) and mankind. This is not so, for the members of the White Birch School were little concerned about society as such, while with Lu Hsün it took first place and stood in the centre of his interests. In the period analysed here, the individual stood – according to Lu Hsün – right in the foreground. It was necessary to reform first individual and

\begin{footnotes}
\item[175] Ibid. p.400.
\item[176] Loc. cit.
\item[177] Loc. cit.
\item[178] Ibid. p.407.
\item[179] Loc. cit.
\end{footnotes}
only then society.\textsuperscript{180} The former was common to Lu Hsün and Nietzsche. The latter was not, for as we have seen, Nietzsche was not concerned about society.

The investigator will not find it difficult to prove Nietzsche's influence on the formation of Lu Hsün's world outlook. But his task is less easy if he has to show the influence of Nietzsche on Lu Hsün's short story writing. Concretely, we have in mind this influence on Lu Hsün's short story \textit{The Diary of Madman}.

Among sinologists, J. D. Chinnery devoted most attention to this question in his article „Influence of Western Literature on Lü Xun's \textit{Diary of Madman}“.\textsuperscript{181} The present writer has two main reservations towards it: he does not agree with Chinnery's view on Nietzsche, and puts a different interpretation on the madman in Lu Hsün's short story.

D. Chinnery sees in Nietzsche an admirer of the „conquerors and the preda-
tors“,\textsuperscript{182} in his ethics, the ethics of „might and power“,\textsuperscript{183} according to him Nietzsche hated the people, was afraid of them, called for brutal suppression.\textsuperscript{184} Our view could already be perceived in the individual judgments scattered throughout this article.

The second issue calls for a deeper analysis.

Everyone who is acquainted with Nietzsche's work and Lu Hsün's short story \textit{The Diary of Madman}, may be struck by the similarity between the madman in \textit{The Gay Science (Die fröhliche Wissenschaft)} and the madman from Lu Hsün's story.

First of all, here is a brief characteristic of Nietzsche's parable: in the early morning hours a madman came to the market place with a lit lantern and cried out: „I seek God, I seek God!“ Round about him were unbelievers and hence, they laughed. The madman accused the people and himself: He and they had killed God. It becomes evident at the first glance that the madman in the parable is Nietzsche himself speaking to the people assembled on the market place, God is embodiment of everything that is ethical and aesthetic. God's dead signifies the decay of old values. Nietzsche puts himself to the task of revaluating all values. The madman in the parable too, undertakes the same task. He intimates that instead of God he will put in man who, in future, is to be the measure of all things.\textsuperscript{185}

In his \textit{Diary of Madman} Lu Hsün also speaks about a madman. He does not create a parable, but an allegorical story. The composition is far more complex.

Lu Hsün's short story is made up of a preface and ten parts of various lengths.

\textsuperscript{181} \textit{BSOAS} XXII, 1959, pp. 309–322.
\textsuperscript{182} Ibid. p. 320.
\textsuperscript{183} Ibid. p. 320.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid. p. 318.
The first two form an introduction into the atmosphere of the plot itself. They are a description of the dreary moods of the principal hero – the madman – who figures in the first person. The so-called madman suffers from paranoia. His fear seems to him to be well-grounded. He is worried by the look of his neighbour's dog, of his neighbour himself, of children. He is vexed when there is moonlight and when the night is gloomy. He feels everyone is out to arm him or even that people wish to kill him.

The third part is the climax of his thinking and contains expressions so often quoted and analysed:

Everything requires careful consideration if one is to understand it. From ancient times rather often – as I recollect – people ate human flesh, but I am rather hazy about it. I browsed the histories – and these have no evidence – but scrawled all over each page were the words: Human-heartedness, righteousness, Way, power. I could not sleep and I read carefully till the midnight. At that time I began to see the words between the lines and the book was filled with the words: 'Eat people!'186

There is no dramatic climax in the short story. In the next parts Lu Hsün discourses on cannibals, their methods, tries to persuade them to give up their unnatural tastes, threatens them, calls for „real men“ (chen-ti jen)[81] and for saving children who had not as yet bitten into human flesh.187

The reader of these lines may ask: Has Lu Hsün really read the parable about the madman from The Gay Science? What we know positively about Lu Hsün is that he studied and knew Thus Spoke Zarathustra; he neither mentions nor quotes from any other Nietzsche's works.

It is possible that Lu Hsün did not know this madman at all. We have introduced this madman on the scene in order to illustrate Nietzsche's overall concept of madman better, and also to help bring out more saliently that, entertained by Lu Hsün.

However, Lu Hsün knew well another „madman“ – Nietzsche does not call him by that name – from Thus Spoke Zarathustra.

In so far as Lu Hsün knew the works of Nietzsche, he referred most frequently to the third part of Zarathustra's „Prologue“. He translated it twice into Chinese,188 twice he quoted from it,189 and in addition, the entire short story The Diary of Madman is nothing more than an interpretation of Nietzsche's words expressed in this part, in Lu Hsün's apprehension: „You have made your way from worm to man, and much in you is still worm. Once you were apes, and even now man is more an ape than any ape.“ Lu Hsün himself implied this in 1935.190

187 Ibid. p.19.
188 The second translation we mentioned above. The first one appeared in wen-yen.
190 See the second part on the note No.189.
It seems that precisely this part was to Lu Hsün the peak, the climax of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, while for other researchers it is usually the third part of the book, not of the „Prologue“. And this third part of the book is also the most poetical one: Nietzsche writes in it about the eternal recurrence which, together with the superman, represents the double vision of the hopes of mankind and the fulfilment of Nietzsche's strivings and his philosophy. But Lu Hsün did not fix his attention to eternal recurrence, for as an adherent of the theory of evolution he could hardly believe in anything similar.

Zarathustra from the third part of the „Prologue“ is presented as quasi madman and resembles that from *The Gay Science*. He, too, turned to people on the market place, he, too, asserts that God is dead. However, while the madman from *The Gay Science* failed to set before mankind any concrete and definite ideal, but only made a statement on the nonexistence of God, and the senselessness of life amidst the „chaos“ of devaluated values, the „madman“ in this part of Zarathustra's „Prologue“ set up already one of Nietzsche's principal ideals – the superman. As has been shown, the image of superman was for Lu Hsün very indefinite and hazy. Consequently in this work he endeavoured to depict the madman in such a way as to enable the reader to have of him a better idea than he himself had of the superman. For Lu Hsün the ideal is not only a madman but also a „real man“. Madman and the „real man“ were one and the same thing.

The image of Lu Hsün's madman is far more concrete than that from Zarathustra. However, it is not so many sided. It impresses as being more effective, but its artistic moulding is weaker. Lu Hsün's madman was taken up with a single idea: cannibalism of his own society. He fears for himself, for those near to him and in particular for the little innocent children. Nietzsche's madman is like a geyser that spouts forth springs of heated water, like a juggler performing brilliant tricks: he is full of ideas, unexpected notions, often ambiguous, and even of indecipherable symbols.

Both these madmen came to China at the time of breaking of all idols, particularly in the ethical domain. They had a truly vehement impact on readers. China at the time was pragmatic and Darwinistic, or rather the Darwinistic element was very strong in Chinese philosophers. As a result, Lu Hsün's madman was understood immediately while Nietzsche's superman failed to be understood, and in addition, he was also distorted because it was not an ideal that could be explained Darwinistically. And Lu Hsün, too, explained to himself the superman of Nietzsche in a like manner. Since he did not believe in the possibility of the existence of a superman as a biological product of nature, that is a new biological species, the ideal of a superman seemed to him irrealizable. He never made a direct philosophical analysis of his ideal of the „true man“ that was to supplant the „indefinite“ superman, but bis works, in particular the essayistic ones, are footnotes to this ideal.

Two more similarities become conspicuous when Zarathustra's „Prologue“ or its third part, is compared with *The Diary of Madman*. Both these works are allegories and both, taken as a whole, have more or less the form of a short story.
Moreover, Zarathustra’s „Prologue“ is a masterly introduction to the main body on Nietzsche’s philosophy, and The Diary of Madman according to the Chinese scholar CHU T’ung¹⁹¹ may be considered as a general preface to the first two collections of Lu Hsün's short stories.¹⁹¹ In the view of the present writer The Diary of Madman can also be considered as the first extensive and well-known exposition of Lu Hsün's philosophical views during the May Fourth Movement period. Lu Hsün's work as a philosophical monument and document of the time, will still require further study.

Lu Hsün's madman is no imitation of Nietzsche's madmen, neither The Diary of Madman is an imitation of Zarathustra's „Prologue“. Already in this first short story Lu Hsün approached creatively the processing of the topic and the artistic processing of the material. Nietzsche's creation served primarily as an incentive, an impulse, it was not a model which Lu Hsün strove slavishly to imitate. From the very start, Lu Hsün's madman is different, for the most part more concentrated, far more concrete, definite, more comprehensible. The madman of Nietzsche is European, even international, the madman of Lu Hsün is Chinese. Together with the image of Lu Hsün's other madman, A Q from the story A Q cheng-chuan¹⁸⁴ (The True Story of A Q), it is perhaps the greatest, or at least, philosophically the most impressive character of modern Chinese fiction. Nietzsche's madman is the outcome of an eruptive mind, the precursor of depth psychology, of existentialists, of the poet of postnaturalistic symbolism. Lu Hsün's madman is the work of a great connoisseur of Chinese classical literature and history, of a diligent student of the „new science, and a confessor of evolution.

It should be noted that J. D. Chinnery in his article does not mention at all the manifest connection between Lu Hsün's and Nietzsche's conception of the madman. He only points to the different approach to this theme by N. GOGOL in his short story of the same name, i.e. The Diary of Madman (Dnevnik sumashchego) from the year 1834,¹⁹² and to the somewhat similar processing of the madman's theme in old Chinese stories.¹⁹³

Furthermore, the traditional interpretation of madman was considerably different from that found in Lu Hsün's work. These people were either fools – like that one from Ch’u who mocked Confucius, or madmen in the sense of hermits or unconventional men. Both these, unconventional men and hermits, were interested mostly, or solely, in themselves, while the madman of Lu Hsün was interested mostly in society, in mankind.

In any case there is far more similarity between Lu Hsün’s and Nietzsche's concept of madman not a fool, than between Lu Hsün's and Gogol's, eventually Lu Hsün's and the traditional Chinese concepts, and this despite the fact that

¹⁹¹ CHU T’ung, Lu Hsün tso-p’ên fen-hsi¹⁸³ (The Analysis of Lu Hsün's Works), Shanghai 1954, p. 82.
¹⁹² J. D. CHINNERY, op. cit. p. 310–311.
¹⁹³ Ibid. p. 320–322.
Gogol gave Lu Hsün's short story its name, and the old Chinese conception probably supplied the original base to Lu Hsün's conception. A study of CHI K'ang's "madman" may possibly have brought Lu Hsün to study Zarathustra's "madman", but without the latter, the madman of Lu Hsün could not have been created. Evidently, it would not have been possible without the slogan of revaluation of all values, without the iconoclastic tendencies so characteristic of the age following Nietzsche, without an admiration for those Einzelnen who are the salt and the light of the world.

In time, Lu Hsün's view of Nietzsche gradually underwent a change. This happened after Lu Hsün had turned from Nietzsche to his "antipode" – Marx. But this took place only after the year 1925.

Sometime after this year Li Shih-ch'en's book Ch'ao-jen che-hsüeh hsüeh-shuo appeared in China in the Chinese title of Ch'ao-jen hsia and Nietzsche's autobiography under the Chinese name of Ni-ts'ai tsu-chuan. Both these were translated by HSIAO Kan. He likewise translated Thus Spoke Zarathustra under the title of Cha-la-t'u-shih-t'o-la ju-shih shuo. This translation was made on the basis of the English version by Thomas COMMON. HSIAO Kan also translated The Gay Science in 1939, under the title K'uai-lo-ti chih-shih.

After the year 1925 a decline of interest in Nietzsche is noticeable in China, though it cannot be said to have disappeared altogether. For example, the philosopher FANG Tung-mei makes frequent references to Nietzsche in his book K'o-hsüeh, che-hsüeh yü jen-sheng (Science, Philosophy and Life), published in 1936. A more detailed study would certainly reveal many more examples of this kind.

At the beginning of the forties philosophers and critics of the group Chan-kuo-ts'e (Intrigues of the Warring States) drew attention to themselves. Chan-kuo-ts'e was originally the title of a historical work, outstanding by its literary quality and written sometime towards the end of the Warring States and the beginning of...
Former Han. A member of this group CH'EN CH'üan\[99\] in his article „Te-kuo min-tsu-ti hsing-ko ho ssu-hsian\[100\] (The Character and Thought of the German Nation), writes also about Nietzsche. He considered him as the most influential and the most successful philosopher of modern times:

Nietzsche is very much against democracy. His ideal society is that of ingenious men, the society of supermen. Democrats everywhere speak of 'quantity.' Nietzsche speaks everywhere of 'quality.' One man with sharp vision is worth more than ten thousand blind, one brave man more than ten thousand cowards.\[201\]

This exposition of Nietzsche sufficiently characterizes Professor Ch'en Ch'üan. Also the adherents of anti-fascist intelligentsia, e.g. OU-YANG Fan-hai\[102\] or Lo Shih-wen\[103\] mention Nietzsche or write about him. But for them, and particularly so for Lo Shih-wen, Nietzsche was before all else, the precursor of fascist philosophy.

As far as China is concerned, it was quite appropriate to characterize the works of Marx and Nietzsche as the representative entities of two principal schools of modern German thought.

History has shown how very much the Chinese have adhered to Marx and how very little they were interested in Nietzsche. They understood both these personalities pragmatically. The teaching of Marx suited their vision of the evolutionary process. And to the understanding of revolution there was only a short step. Those believing initially in Nietzsche, usually went over to Marx. Of those mentioned in our study they were: Mao Tun, Li Shi-ch'en, Kuo Mo-jo and Lu Hsün. Perhaps there were others of whom we are not aware. This transition was rapid in Mao Tun and Kuo Mo-jo, while it took a long time in the case of Li Shih-ch'en and Lu Hsün. This was probably associated with the depth of their knowledge, but it was certainly influenced also by other factors.

Nietzsche's philosophy was not meant for modern China. We have seen already at the time of the May Fourth Movement China sought, before all rise, a philosophy that could serve as an instrument for action, and this, Nietzsche's philosophy could not do even in its most diversely distorted forms in which Chinese readers came to know it. Nor could it be suitable later. At that time it was spoiled by the „fascist mantle“ and therefore, it was better that less attention was devoted to it.

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\[202\] OU-YANG Fan-hai, Wen-hsüeh lun-p'ing\[102\] (Literary and Critical Articles), Ch'ung-ch'ing 1943, p.149–163.

\[203\] Lo Shih-wen, „Lu Hsün yü Ni-ts'ai“ (Lu Hsün and Nietzsche), in CHING Sung\[103\], ed., Lu Hsün-ti ch'uang-foo fang-la chi chi yü-ta\[104\] (Lu Hsün's Creative Methods and Other Studies), Kui-lin 1942, p.40–71. CHING Sung is a pseudonym of Madame Lu Hsün, i.e. HSÜ Kuang-p'ing\[107\].
Originally, Nietzsche wanted to belong to the whole world, but the character of his teaching caused him to belong only to a small number who succeeded correctly to understand his superman, and to those who took contact with him: psychoanalysts, existentialists, O. Spengler, Th. Mann, G.B. Shaw, H. Hesse and others.

What is, in reality, the „heritage“ from Nietzsche's rich bequest that took root in China? It is first and foremost part of Lu Hsün's personality and work which Nietzsche helped to produce. And of course, also Li Shih-ch'en's work, prior to his conversion to Marxism. More could be brought to light by further research.

And what is the legacy that failed to take root in China? Shortly after Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Lu Hsün, values, in particular „ethical“ and „aesthetic“ values, became forgotten in China. The vision of a happy future, of social and political progress dimmed everything else. The important aspect of material existence overshadowed the not less important aspect of inner life. They began to reform society without the attempts at reforming the individual.

It has been clearly shown that even among those who propagated Nietzsche in China, Nietzsche's ideal of a man striving for self-perfection, Nietzsche's idea of „giving style“ to one's character\(^{204}\) failed to find an understanding. And this was his principal ideal at all, an ideal of man who „overcomes“ and educates himself – equal to the ideal of the so frequently depreciated, disparaged and misunderstood superman.

\(^{204}\) W. KAUFMANN, op. cit. p. 359.

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